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C O N T E N T S
Legal scholarship is sometimes faulted for being 
arcane, abstruse, or out of touch with the real legal 
issues of the day.
One common charge leveled at scholarly work is 
that there is a disconnect between the academy and 
the profession. Some critics argue that, while legal 
scholarship may be of interest to academics, it isn’t  
of much use to the judges and lawyers who employ 
the law.
The scholarship in this issue of Fordham Law’s Faculty Spotlight Journal 
respectfully dissents. Scholarship by Fordham Law faculty is of great help to the 
legal profession. It directly engages with the most important, ongoing debates  
in law and in our society. It influences government policy. It inspires changes in 
our judiciary and legal system. 
Our faculty produces scholarship that has an impact on the real world. This 
impact is an important part of the culture at Fordham Law and stems from our 
approach to legal education. We stress how lawyers can use their skills of  
critical analysis to question the status quo, challenge received wisdom, and 
make a difference in the world.
Deborah Denno conducts a comprehensive study of the use of neuroscientific 
evidence and shares some disturbing results. Sean Griffith fundamentally 
transforms deal litigation in corporate law cases. Chi Mgbako challenges 
dominant conceptions of sex workers in Africa, advocating for the recognition 
of their basic rights and human dignity. John Pfaff reveals the truth behind the 
country’s distressingly large prison population. Jed Shugerman plumbs the  
past to illuminate the contemporary problems of our campaign finance system.
The scholarship in this journal represents just a small sample of our professors’ 
fine work. I encourage you to visit our website to learn more about the work  
of all our professors as well as our renowned student-edited journals, which are 
among the most cited in the country.
I hope you enjoy reading about Fordham Law scholarship that is making an 
impact throughout the legal profession and beyond.
 
Matthew Diller 
Dean 
Paul Fuller Professor of Law
Fordham Law School
F O R E W O R D
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Criminal law in the 21st century  
is fraught with contradiction. 
Newer evidentiary techniques, while innovative, are 
often misused. Old-fashioned methods of punishment, 
while widely derided, should be considered viable. 
These are but two examples of the insights that 
Deborah Denno’s wide-ranging and interdisciplinary 
approach to research brings to bear on our criminal 
justice system. 
Her groundbreaking neuroscience study, for instance, confronts the 
mistaken belief that brain scans of a victim’s injury in shaken baby syndrome 
(SBS) cases can be used to establish a defendant’s criminal intent.
The research—an original analysis of 150 key factors relevant to the criminal 
justice system from 800 cases across two decades—reveals the following:
•	 SBS accounts for nearly half of cases involving victim neuroscience 
evidence.
•	 Prosecutors have been allowed to concoct intent from brain scans that 
were admitted for the sole purpose of presenting the victim’s injury.
•	 The science behind SBS diagnosis is problematic and controversial.
•	 SBS cases are a transparent example of the failure of the criminal justice 
system to deal adequately with the influx of neuroscience evidence in  
the courtroom.
In her long-term work studying capital punishment, Denno posits that a 
long-maligned form of execution—the firing squad—may be a more viable 
alternative than the highly problematic method of lethal injection:
•	 Shortages of lethal injection drugs have rendered the procedure riskier 
and more litigation-prone than ever.
•	 The firing squad is the only current method of execution that involves 
trained professionals and results in a swift and certain death.
•	 The putative brutality of the firing squad—fueled by historical 
stereotype—appears far preferable to the prolonged torment of lethal 
injection drugs.
Deborah W. Denno
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Concocting Criminal Intent
105 Georgetown Law Journal (forthcoming 2017) 
A defendant’s mens rea, specifically criminal intent, is the most critical element in the criminal law, yet it is an amorphous concept. The history of mens rea illustrates how courts have long struggled to define intent, with efforts at clarification often leading to greater 
confusion. As a result, prosecutors attempt to prove mens rea through the use of 
circumstantial evidence, and frequently must “concoct” the defendant’s level of 
intent to some degree. With the emergence of neuroscience evidence, it seems 
that prosecutors have found the ultimate tool to do so. Yet inappropriate reliance 
on brain scans of a victim’s injuries leads to a level of speculation and impact that 
defies both the purposes of the science as well as its appropriate role within the 
criminal justice system. 
My research, however, indicates that this approach is surprisingly successful. 
Courts defer to prosecutors’ efforts to manufacture intent out of victim brain 
scans that were taken and admitted for solely medical purposes. Large scale 
research studies of criminal cases can better reveal how and why these legal 
strategies exist, as shown by my unprecedented study of all criminal cases (totaling 
800) that addressed neuroscience evidence over the course of two decades, from 
1992 to 2012. I will refer to my research as the Neuroscience Study. The cases in 
the Neuroscience Study were collected employing the Westlaw and Lexis legal 
databases. I used information from these cases to code and analyze over 150 key 
factors relevant to the criminal justice system, especially mens rea and culpability. 
Over a third of these cases pertained to victims. My focus is on these victim cases, 
particularly how neuroscience evidence explicates the degree of a victim’s injury 
and what bearing that injury has on efforts to assess a defendant’s level of mens rea.
In my Neuroscience Study, nearly half of the cases involving victim neurosci-
ence evidence are based on a theory of shaken baby syndrome (SBS), a medical 
diagnosis with controversial scientific underpinnings and distorted legal ram-
ifications. The diagnosis often successfully serves as the sole foundation for a 
prosecutor’s case, with no proof of the defendant’s act or intent beyond the 
victim’s brain scan and the accompanying medical expert testimony. Shaken baby 
syndrome cases thus portray a troubling phenomenon in which the key element 
of mens rea is either unclear or overlooked altogether and prosecutors are permit-
ted to concoct intent out of brain scans that were admitted for the sole purpose 
of presenting the victim’s injury. While reliance on circumstantial evidence is 
EXCERPTS
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nothing new, these cases are unusual in the extent to which prosecutors must go 
to construct mens rea. Moreover, the syndrome’s history clearly indicates that it 
was never intended to be used in this way; indeed, this practice has been dispar-
aged in recent years by numerous scientists, including Norman Guthkelch, the 
syndrome’s creator. 
In 1971 Guthkelch, a British pediatric surgeon, published the research that 
would lay the original foundation for SBS. After examining thirteen cases in 
which infants evidenced bleeding in the brain (subdural hematomas), Guthkelch 
proposed that such injuries could occur simply by manually shaking the infant, 
without the infant’s head hitting any other surface area. Three years later, John 
Caffey, an American pediatric radiologist, hypothesized that the rapid accelera-
tion-deceleration forces applied during the shaking sheared the veins inside the 
brain, thus causing subdural hematomas, a phenomenon he called “whiplash 
shaken infant syndrome.” It would take another decade for the term “shaken 
baby syndrome” to be mentioned in a publication for the first time, and more 
time still for SBS to be systematically defined by the presence of three classic 
symptoms, or the “triad”: subdural hematoma, bleeding in the retina (retinal 
hemorrhages), and brain swelling (cerebral edema). These symptoms can result 
in a significant brain injury that may cause permanent brain damage or death, 
especially in young children. 
Proper evaluation of SBS can be detected in several ways: (1) CT scan, which 
can measure injuries that need immediate attention; (2) MRI, which provides a 
magnetic field and radio waves to show finer images of a child’s brain; (3) skeletal 
survey, which entails administering a range of skeletal X-rays of all the bones 
(such as extremities, ribs, skull, pelvis, and spine) so examiners can determine the 
severity and type of fractures, as well as whether there have been prior fractures; 
(4) eye exam, which assesses the presence of bleeding or other eye injuries; and 
(5) blood tests, which determine if there are any genetic, metabolic, or other 
disorders that look similar to SBS but may provide alternative explanations for a 
child’s injuries.
Soon after Guthkelch and Caffey’s research was published, SBS was widely ad-
opted in the medical community as a clinical diagnosis for head injury inflicted 
on infants. The link between SBS and criminality developed more gradually. The 
first SBS case, that of John Schneider, took place in 1984, but it would be one 
of only fifteen such appellate cases decided before 1990; in sharp contrast, there 
would be hundreds more cases in the early 1990s and beyond. Indeed, by the 
late 1990s, SBS had garnered a substantial level of “acceptance and enormous-
ly widespread popularity, with no real investigation or even question as to its 
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scientific validity.” A constellation of factors contributed to this status, ranging 
from the establishment of mandatory reporting laws for health care and other 
professionals to the increased use of clinical medicine in legal cases, to a growing 
presumption that any child’s unexplained injury was likely to have been inflicted.
Also by this time, the ties between SBS and the requisite elements of a crime had 
become firmly entrenched, forming something of a legal triad: shaking was the act 
that caused harm to the infant; the force with which the baby was shaken indicat-
ed the perpetrator’s mental state, especially intent; and finally, the caretaker who 
was last with the conscious baby was the defendant. The very term “shaken baby 
syndrome” fuels the causal perception of these associations, with its suggestion 
that there is a singular origin of the act—“shaking”—and its implication of intent, 
since shaking a baby is only rarely accidental. By 2012 even Guthkelch published 
an article severely deriding how the syndrome had been misapplied over the years, 
particularly as a vehicle for connoting a caretaker’s intent to harm. Indeed, recent 
findings and investigation into the original research have seriously questioned 
both the scientific and legal underpinnings of SBS. 
There is a general consensus in much of the modern literature on SBS that the sci-
ence behind the diagnosis is problematic and controversial. For example, despite 
many reported cases of shaken infants, there has not been a single documented 
instance in which someone has witnessed shaking alone cause brain injury in an 
infant, nor has such damage been replicated in a controlled laboratory setting. 
Furthermore, no study has shown that human beings are capable of creating the 
necessary rotational acceleration through manual shaking to cause brain injuries 
in infants without impact. These and other findings conflict with Guthkelch’s 
original hypothesis that manual shaking alone can manifest in triad symptoms.  
As the science around SBS became more controversial, using the diagnosis to 
show criminal intent becomes even more problematic. In fact, overwhelmingly 
the literature converges on a similar theme: it is erroneous for doctors, medical 
experts, and subsequently courts, to infer that a defendant intentionally abused  
an infant based only on the presence of SBS symptoms. 
Researchers now recognize that numerous conditions can mimic SBS, includ-
ing congenital malformations, metabolic or genetic disorders, hematological 
disorders, infectious diseases, autoimmune conditions, aneurysms, stroke, and 
chain reactions to cardiorespiratory arrest, hypoxia, resuscitation, and seizures. 
As radiological imaging improves, even more infants are found to have subdural 
hemorrhages following birth that are not associated with any abuse whatsoever. 
Guthkelch points to one study that reported 46% of asymptomatic infants had 
subdural hemorrhages following a normal birth; for symptomatic infants with 
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difficult births or congenital diseases, the percentage is likely significantly higher. 
While most subdural bleeds resolve on their own, infants who do not improve 
are more likely to have a preexisting condition that may result in more brain 
hemorrhaging. Research on the causes and mechanisms of subdural hemorrhag-
ing is still developing, yet much of what previously had been accepted as fact is 
now being called into question. It is increasingly difficult to justify deciphering 
the state of mind of an alleged abuser on the basis of such controversial research. 
My Neuroscience Study research reveals, however, that courts are surprisingly 
receptive to the prosecution’s efforts, notwithstanding weaknesses in the under-
lying science. Shaken baby syndrome cases illustrate a disturbing phenomenon 
in which the crucial element of mens rea is either muddled or missing altogether 
in the crime that has been charged. Yet prosecutors are effectively—and with-
out objection from the defense—concocting intent out of victim neuroscience 
evidence that is admitted for solely medical purposes. My study shows prosecu-
torial exploitation of victim neuroscience evidence, with SBS cases representing a 
perfect storm of the legal and scientific factors that lead to such a strategy.
My Neuroscience Study further reveals that SBS cases are merely the more 
transparent examples of the criminal justice system’s failure to deal adequately 
with the surging influx of neuroscience evidence into the courtroom. The Study’s 
adult-victim cases provide context for the child-victim cases. While adult-victim 
cases are far more factually and scientifically varied, prosecutors still use neuro-
science evidence in nearly one-fifth of the cases to reinforce a determination of 
the defendant’s mental state. The adult-victim cases illustrate the benefits and 
drawbacks of victim neuroscience evidence when it comes to intent determina-
tions. Some courts rely on neuroscience evidence to suggest a lower level of mens 
rea for a defendant—recklessness rather than knowledge or intent. Yet other 
courts can concoct a higher level of intent with no stronger proof. SBS cases of 
course represent an extreme situation—a microcosm of prosecutorial misuse of 
victim neuroscience evidence more generally, particularly when it involves de-
termining a defendant’s mental state. While the criminal law needs neuroscience 
to help elucidate and refine outmoded conceptions of mental state, it is clear 
that such innovations can come with the baggage of misuse. Large-scale research 
projects such as my Neuroscience Study can detect existing or potential misap-
plications of neuroscience with an eye toward amelioration.
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The Firing Squad as “A Known and 
Available Alternative Method of 
Execution” Post-Glossip
49 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 749–793 (2016)  
(as part of the symposium “At a Crossroads: The Future of the  
Death Penalty”) 
In Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015), the United States Supreme Court held 5-4 that three death-row inmates failed to establish that the drug midazolam created “a substantial risk of severe pain” when used as the first of three drugs in Oklahoma’s lethal injection procedure. Writing for the 
majority, Justice Samuel Alito explained that the evidence presented from both 
sides supported the district court’s view: “midazolam can render a person insen-
sate to pain” and petitioners had failed to demonstrate midazalom’s inadequacy 
under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. In 
addition, the Court provided “two independent reasons” to affirm the district 
court determination: first, petitioners could not “identify a known and available 
alternative method of execution that entails a lesser risk of pain, a requirement 
of all Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claims”; and second, they were 
unable to show that the district court committed clear error in rejecting petition-
ers’ arguments. 
The Court’s rationale concerning alternative methods of execution, however,  
potentially represents Glossip’s broadest impact. Even though Richard Glossip’s 
fate remains unknown and the case’s striking dissents captured much of the legal 
and media commentary, Glossip may serve as Eighth Amendment precedent 
given states’ ongoing frustrations in finding lethal injection drugs, despite the 
Court’s approval of midazolam. 
Glossip is the second of two Supreme Court cases concerning lethal injection 
drugs decided in close succession. In the first case, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 
(2008), the Court held, in a highly splintered 7-2 decision with a plurality 
opinion, that Kentucky’s use of a three-drug protocol, the most common lethal 
injection procedure in 2008, satisfied the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause. Defendants had failed to demonstrate that the 
protocol posed a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of “serious harm” 
compared to “known and available alternatives.” The three-drug protocol at 
issue in Baze consisted of sodium thiopental, a barbiturate anesthetic that brings 
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about deep unconsciousness; pancuronium bromide, a total muscle relaxant that 
paralyzes all voluntary muscles and causes suffocation; and potassium chloride, 
a toxin that induces irreversible cardiac arrest. According to Baze, states using 
“substantially similar” protocols would be on constitutionally safe ground. As 
a result, many observers of the death penalty anticipated that Baze would quell 
execution method challenges.
Glossip’s credibility rests on the belief that Baze “cleared any legal obstacle to 
the use of [this] three-drug protocol.” Yet there is no basis for that belief, quite 
the contrary. The three-drug protocol at issue in Baze is no longer viable due to 
ongoing and unpredictable shortages of lethal injection drugs during the years 
following the Court’s decision. Indeed, these shortages have created far more 
litigation and upheaval than the wide range of lethal injection challenges that 
preceded Baze. The litigation has also targeted two developments: first, the con-
tinual efforts by departments of corrections to seek never-tried lethal injection 
drugs and protocols and second, a series of widely publicized botched execu-
tions, a disproportionate number of which have involved the use of midazolam. 
Overall, then, states have adopted wholly inappropriate drug substitutes to keep 
executions going despite risky and chaotic results. Glossip is the Court’s effort to 
review yet another lethal injection protocol a mere seven years after Baze.
Yet there are several areas where the Glossip Court goes wrong in glaringly 
inaccurate or misleading ways given the vast history and literature on execution 
methods and their changes from the nineteenth century through the start of the 
twenty-first century. Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent touches on sound and 
convincing reasons why death row inmates considering the hazards associated 
with lethal injection may prefer the firing squad as an alternative method of 
execution. According to the Court’s “known and available alternative method 
of execution” standard, as defined by both the majority opinion and Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent, the firing squad is the most viable “known and available 
alternative” that meets the delineations, however meager, outlined by the Court. 
Indeed, it is the only current form of execution involving trained professionals, 
and it delivers a swift and certain death. 
This is not the first time that an argument for the firing squad has been made in 
recent years, but previous examinations occurred before Glossip and within the 
confines of other cultural or doctrinal delineations of the Eighth Amendment. 
Glossip’s “alternative method” requirement adds yet another dimension to exe-
cution method challenges and it strengthens the seriousness and acceptability 
of the firing squad as an apt means of execution. Justice Sotomayor is the first 
Justice to proactively and favorably compare the firing squad—or any other 
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execution method—to lethal injection, albeit briefly. Although legal commen-
tators and the news media have all but bypassed Justice Sotomayor’s firing squad 
comments, her compelling analysis highlights the extent to which she and the 
accompanying Justices question the lethal injection process. 
Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent stands out as the primary vehicle for critiquing the 
“known and available alternative standard,” by thoroughly explaining why it 
is unjustified for the Glossip Court to attribute this standard so substantially 
to Baze. First, Baze never articulated such a standard, much less one as condi-
tionally dependent as the Glossip Court makes it to out to be. Otherwise, the 
resulting message would have “[led] to patently absurd consequences.” As Justice 
Sotomayor notes, “[a] method of execution that is intolerably painful—even 
to the point of being the chemical equivalent of burning alive—will, the Court 
holds, be unconstitutional if, and only if, there is a ‘known and available alterna-
tive’ method of execution.” While the Glossip Court states that Baze precluded 
all arguments that would suggest otherwise, Justice Sotomayor stresses that 
“Baze held no such thing.” For example, the Glossip Court refers only to the Baze 
plurality opinion to support its version of the “known and available alternative” 
requirement; yet none of the Baze concurrences, which were needed to back the 
Baze Court’s judgment, pronounced a comparable perspective. Even the Baze 
plurality never stated “that all challenges” to a state’s execution method must  
be subject to such a “comparative-risk” assessment. As Justice Sotomayor states,  
“[r]ecognizing the relevance of available alternatives is not at all the same as 
concluding that their absence precludes a claimant from showing that a chosen 
method carries objectively intolerable risks.”
Justice Sotomayor nonetheless contributes an analysis of what “a known and 
available alternative method of execution” could be, even though she doesn’t 
agree with the requirement. As such, her approach provides potential guidance 
for future courts and litigators who seemingly have no choice but to operate 
within the confines of Glossip. What Justice Sotomayor proposes could turn 
Glossip on its head: condemned inmates might reject lethal injection and 
“suggest the firing squad as an alternative.” She hones this point by considering 
the evidence that would be most pertinent to inmates making this suggestion. 
For example, “the firing squad is significantly more reliable than other methods, 
including lethal injection” and “there is some reason to think that it is relatively 
quick and painless.” While the firing squad “could be seen as a devolution to a 
more primitive era,” and “the blood and physical violence that comes with it” 
a step in that direction, those characterizations do not make the firing squad 
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“unconstitutional.” That said, the method’s “visible brutality” could potentially 
prompt Eighth Amendment arguments. 
 
Justice Sotomayor’s final assessments of the firing squad are the most compelling 
because they consider the calculation of the method’s cruelty versus visible vio-
lence through the eyes of a condemned inmate. As Justice Sotomayor explains, 
an inmate may view the “visible yet relatively painless violence” associated with 
the firing squad as “vastly preferable to an excruciatingly painful death hidden 
behind a veneer of medication.” With that statement, Justice Sotomayor rightly 
acknowledges that lethal injection may be even more gruesome than the  
firing squad if only we were allowed to see behind lethal injection’s “curtain.”  
A substantial literature and case law suggests that she is correct.
The Court’s Misinterpretation of Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is detailed and comprehensive, covering a number of 
different topics and arguments. Yet it is intriguing that the Glossip majority focus-
es on her commentary about the firing squad, particularly given the commentary’s 
brevity and hypothetical posture. Indeed, the Glossip majority completely 
mischaracterizes what Justice Sotomayor says about the firing squad, and also 
inaccurately attributes her comments to other methods of execution. According 
to the Court, for example, Justice Sotomayor implies that any state that uses any 
of the four methods of execution existing prior to lethal injection would violate 
the Eighth Amendment. This reasoning holds, says the majority, even though 
Justice Sotomayor concedes that “‘there is some reason to think that [the firing 
squad] is relatively quick and painless.’” While Justice Sotomayor mentions nei-
ther electrocution nor lethal gas, the Court nonetheless incorporates these other 
methods in its analysis of her statements. Indeed, the Court interprets Justice 
Sotomayor’s arguments as implying that “it would be unconstitutional to use a 
method that ‘could be seen as a devolution to a more primitive era.’” Yet Justice 
Sotomayor says no such thing. Using this misguided approach, the Court suggests 
that Justice Sotomayor boxes in the choices of execution methods: past execution 
methods are unacceptable because they are “primitive,” while present methods are 
unacceptable because there is no viable drug. The end result, in the Court’s view, is 
an argument siding with eliminating the death penalty. 
Justice Sotomayor, however, never makes the argument the majority attributes to 
her but argues just the opposite. She explicitly states that the brutality of a firing 
squad execution does not render the method unconstitutional and that it may 
be far preferable to the torment of lethal injection drugs. In addition, she does 
not argue against the death penalty in general and notably did not join Justice 
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Breyer’s anti-death penalty dissent. Instead, Justice Sotomayor provides guidance 
for the most humane way to implement the death penalty within the context 
of Glossip. While Justice Sotomayor suggests that the firing squad may also be 
viewed as a “devolution” and may raise Eighth Amendment issues, her concerns 
about the method are warranted. For example, neither she nor any other court 
has provided the kind of detailed analysis of the science or strategy behind 
the firing squad that would assuage any and all Eighth Amendment questions. 
Rather, Justice Sotomayor explains why the firing squad may be a viable alterna-
tive method of execution, thereby pointing in a different direction that makes 
sense for legislatures and courts to consider.
The Firing Squad Alternative
The firing squad could potentially meet Glossip’s “alternative method” require-
ments of being “known,” “available,” and “entail[ing] a lesser risk of pain.” 
For example, the firing squad has a long history and worldwide application 
(“known”); it is pervasive in many dimensions of our society ranging from law 
enforcement to self-protection (“available”); and there is evidence suggesting it 
is the quickest, least painful, and most reliable method that currently exists (“a 
lesser risk of pain”). As Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s dissent in Wood v. Ryan, 759 
F.3d 1076, 1103 (9th Cir. 2014), suggests, the firing squad also satisfies an array 
of practical and constitutional concerns that counter the long-held problems 
associated with lethal injection procedures. While Judge Kozinski’s observations 
were made nearly a year before Glossip was decided, they firmly fit within the 
Glossip “alternative method” standard. 
Chief Judge Kozinski acknowledges that “firing squads can be messy” because 
“we are shedding human blood.” Regardless, lethal injection can also be “messy” 
and bloody in ways that medical experts, lawyers, and scholars have increasingly 
documented despite departments of corrections’ efforts to shield the entire pro-
cess in secrecy. Most importantly, observers of modern firing squad executions do 
not describe “mess,” visible brutality,” or “blood” but rather a process that may be 
far more “sterile” in perception and procedure than lethal injection.
Of all the execution methods in this country, perceptions and application of 
the firing squad are among the most contradictory. On the one hand, there is 
substantial evidence to suggest that the firing squad is the most humane method 
of execution. In Justice Sotomayor’s words, it is “more reliable” as well as “rela-
tively quick and painless.” For example, there is a consensus that Gary Gilmore’s 
1977 execution was swift, dignified, and consistent with protocol. The same can 
be said of the execution of Albert Lee Taylor nearly twenty years later. According 
to a corrections official who observed Taylor’s execution, Utah’s firing squad 
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procedure “was carried out in as dignified a manner as [he had] ever witnessed.” 
In addition, a Salt Lake Tribune reporter’s description of the 2010 execution of 
Ronnie Lee Gardner found the scene more pristine and removed than he might 
have predicted. “Firing four bullets into a man’s chest is, by definition, violent.  
If it can also be clinical and sterile, then that also happened in this execution.” 
This same reporter never saw blood, which seemed to pool instead under 
Gardner’s shirt. While the reporter could not tell what Gardner was feeling or  
if he experienced pain, in his view this was not a “messy” execution.
Of course, Judge Kozinski’s “messy” reference goes beyond simply the spilling of 
blood. Rather Judge Kozinski hones the point that we should also have a method 
that treats the firing squad as a true punishment, rather than a medical illusion: 
“[i]f we, as a society, cannot stomach the splatter from an execution carried out 
by firing squad, then we shouldn’t be carrying out executions at all.” Together 
with the evidence of the firing squad’s greater humaneness and sterility, this view 
balances Justice Sotomayor’s concern that the firing squad “could be seen as a 
devolution to a more primitive era,” or a mark of “visible brutality” prompting 
Eighth Amendment arguments.
Firing squad executions occur rarely. Some of the most accessible information  
derives from eyewitness accounts and historical anecdotes. That said, the con-
sensus of opinion concerning firing squads comports with Justice Sotomayor’s 
argument that they are swift and relatively pain free. While “image” may be a  
factor discouraging the use of firing squads, one can question lethal injection’s 
image as well, at which point lethal injection’s pretense of medical veneer can 
seem far more “primitive” than a pistol. Although the firing squad appears 
saddled with a distinct image problem, respected jurists and public opinion 
increasingly are coming to its reputational rescue while also pointing to the  
disastrous experiment that lethal injection has become.
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Sources of corporate governance 
authority are shifting dramatically.
In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, day-to-day 
corporate governance matters have increasingly fallen 
within the ambit of corporate compliance programs, 
while corporate law, especially Delaware law, retains its 
principal role in regulating mergers and acquisitions.
Sean Griffith’s scholarship turns a bright light on both of these forces shaping 
corporate governance. 
His article “Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance” examines the 
unprecedented growth of compliance programs and proposes that scholars 
of corporate law and corporate governance treat compliance as a serious, and 
seriously important, field of study. The article highlights
•	 the origins of compliance and demonstrates its maturation into a corporate 
governance function;
•	 how compliance challenges settled theories of the firm and upsets the 
political economy of corporate governance function;
•	 problems of agency costs and information asymmetries embedded within 
the current structure of compliance; and 
•	 the impact of changing enforcement tactics and increasing transparency.
On the merger front, Griffith co-authored a widely cited article on settlement 
practices in merger litigation, “Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement,” which 
has been influential in changing settlement practices in Delaware and across 
the country. The article argues that
•	 the value of nonpecuniary relief in merger settlements should be measured 
by its effect on shareholder voting;
•	 because material disclosures provide information contrary to management’s 
recommendation, disclosure-only settlements should increase shareholder 
voting against the transaction;
•	 because empirical tests fail to demonstrate that disclosures have any 
statistically significant effect on merger voting, disclosure-only settlements 
cannot be shown to provide any material benefit to shareholders; and 
•	 courts should stop glibly awarding fees for disclosure-only settlements.
Sean J. Griffith
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Corporate Governance in an Era  
of Compliance
57 William & Mary Law Review (2016)
American corporate governance has undergone a quiet revolution. Much of its basic role—the oversight and control of internal corporate affairs—has been overtaken by compliance. Although compliance with law and regulation is not a new idea, the establish-
ment of an autonomous department within firms to detect and deter violations 
of law and policy is. American corporations have witnessed the dawn of a new 
era: the era of compliance.
That we now live in an era of compliance is beyond serious doubt. Over the past 
decade, compliance has blossomed into a thriving industry, and the compliance 
department has emerged, in many firms, as the co-equal of the legal department. 
Compliance is commonly headed by a Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) who 
reports directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and, often, to the board as 
well. Moreover, firms have gone on a hiring spree to staff compliance, with large 
firms adding hundreds, even thousands of compliance officers at a time.
The reorganization of American business around compliance, by itself, is not 
necessarily remarkable. After all, firms routinely reorganize their businesses, and 
such reorganizations, because they take place under the fundamental authority 
of the board of directors, do not challenge basic structures of authority. For ex-
ample, the establishment of an Information Technology department, headed by a 
Chief Technology Officer, can hardly be seen as a fundamental shift in corporate 
governance. Compliance, however, is different. The contemporary compliance 
function serves a core governance function, yet its origins cannot be traced to 
a board delegation or other traditional source of governance authority. Unlike 
other governance structures, its origins are exogenous to the firm.
The impetus for compliance does not come from a traditional corporate constit-
uency—in other words, not from shareholders, managers, employees, creditors, 
or customers. Instead, it comes from the government. Compliance is a de facto 
government mandate imposed upon firms by means of ex ante incentives, ex post 
enforcement tactics, and formal signaling efforts. The imposition of governance 
structures aimed at compliance is a novel exercise of government power. In 
imposing these structures, the government is not simply making rules that firms 
must follow, as it does when it passes new laws and regulations, nor is it adjusting 
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its traditional tools—the amount of enforcement and the size of sanctions—to 
assure compliance with existing law and regulation. Instead, through compliance, 
the government dictates how firms must comply, imposing specific governance 
structures expressly designed to change how the firm conducts its business.
Moreover, government interventions in compliance come not through the 
traditional levers of state corporate or federal securities law, but rather through 
prosecutions and regulatory enforcement actions. The resulting reforms are thus 
not the product of a transparent and politically accountable legislative process, 
nor are they the product of regulatory rule making, subject to cost-benefit 
analysis and public comment. Rather, they are extracted in an opaque settlement 
process under the Sword of Damocles. Compliance thus presents a profound 
challenge to theories of corporate law and corporate governance.
The contemporary compliance function subverts the notion that corporate 
governance arrangements both are and ought to be the product of a bargain 
between shareholders and managers. Compliance rewrites Ronald Coase’s famous 
passage on the internal organization of firms. Compliance officers come into an 
organization not necessarily (or not entirely) at the behest of an “entrepreneur- 
co-ordinator, who directs production,” but rather pursuant to the directive of a 
government enforcer. Seen through the prism of compliance, the corporation no 
longer resembles a nexus of contracts but rather a real entity, subject to punish-
ment and rehabilitation at the pleasure of a sovereign. Compliance thus rejects 
mainstream accounts of the firm in favor of older, largely discarded theories.
Furthermore, the imposition of intra-firm governance from extra-firm sources 
introduces a host of outside interests and incentives into firm decision making. 
Once corporate governance is no longer seen as the exclusive domain of share-
holders and managers, questions arise over what purpose or purposes the firm 
should serve. Compliance thus revives the “other constituencies” debate—that 
is, the argument over whether corporations should serve constituencies other 
than shareholders and interests other than wealth maximization. Compliance 
also raises the question whether the authorities pressing for corporate reforms 
have the right incentives and the right information to do so. If they do not, the 
development of compliance may merely result in the imposition of inefficient 
governance structures on firms. 
Yet, in spite of squarely challenging current orthodoxy on corporate law and 
governance, compliance is largely absent from the mainstream corporate law 
literature. Aspects of compliance, especially those relating to the prosecution 
and settlement of cases against corporations, do appear in scholarship on 
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criminal law and regulatory enforcement. Mainstream corporate law scholarship, 
however, remains centrally focused on the agency cost problem, and because 
compliance is not principally concerned with agency costs, blithely unaware of 
the challenge posed by compliance to its underlying assumptions. Because it ap-
pears as an unexplained and, under current models, unexplainable phenomenon, 
compliance exposes deficiencies in corporate law theory. Likewise, compliance 
itself is undertheorized. 
This Article aims to change that by launching compliance as a field of inquiry 
for scholars of corporate law and corporate governance. Its descriptive account 
documents the origins of compliance and demonstrates its maturation into a 
corporate governance function. The central argument in this Article is that the 
contemporary compliance department is the product of a de facto government 
mandate that, although felt most strongly by firms in highly regulated industries, 
has become a market-wide concern.
This Article’s normative portion then draws out the implications, both theoret-
ical and pragmatic, of the descriptive account. It demonstrates how compliance 
challenges settled theories of the firm and upsets the political economy of corpo-
rate governance. Fundamentally, compliance begs the foundational question of 
who the author of corporate governance arrangements ought to be. The Article’s 
normative account also addresses more pragmatic problems of agency costs and 
information asymmetries and the implications for firm efficiency. Finally, the 
Article offers two directions for reform—one focused on changing enforcement 
tactics, the other on increasing transparency. At this stage in the debate, however, 
solving the problems posed by compliance may be less important than raising 
them. That is the fundamental contribution of this Article—to engage scholarly 
debate and provide a framework for dialogue between prosecutors, policymak-
ers, and scholars of corporate law and corporate governance.
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Griffith’s 2015 article about the “peppercorn settlement” has been widely cited 
in Delaware corporate law cases and is credited, along with Professor Griffith’s 
own shareholder objections, with changing settlement practices in merger 
litigation. The article was selected by Corporate Practice Commentator as 
one of the top 10 corporate and securities law review articles of 2015. 
Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: 
An Empirical Analysis and a 
Proposal for Reform
93 Texas Law Review 557–624 (2015) (with Jill E. Fisch and Steven Davidoff 
Solomon)
Deal litigation is pervasive in the United States. Multiple teams of plaintiffs file 
lawsuits challenging virtually every public company merger, often in multiple 
jurisdictions. Moreover, the frequency of merger litigation has risen sharply 
over the last several years. In 2012, 92% of deals over $100 million and 96% of 
deals over $500 million were challenged in shareholder litigation. In 2013, the 
frequency was even higher—97.5% of deals over $100 million were challenged 
through litigation, and each transaction triggered an average of seven separate 
lawsuits.
Although deal litigation is pervasive, these lawsuits rarely result in a monetary 
recovery for the plaintiff class. Rather, the vast majority end in settlement or dis-
missal. In most settled cases, the only relief provided to shareholders consists of 
supplemental disclosures in the merger proxy statement. In compensation for the 
benefit produced by these settlements—often worth no more, in the words of a 
famous jurist, than a “peppercorn”—plaintiffs’ attorneys receive a fee award.1
The dynamic, in which every deal is challenged but only the lawyers get paid,  
has led to widespread skepticism concerning the value of public-company merger 
litigation among both academic and professional commentators. The view 
underlying much of this skepticism is that litigation that returns no monetary re-
covery to the plaintiff class must be without merit. Equating merit and monetary 
recovery, however, implicitly dismisses the value of nonpecuniary relief. Such 
1  Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. CIV. A. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 21, 1995).
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nonpecuniary relief may be valuable to shareholders, but it is hard to determine 
its value.
Importantly, Delaware law explicitly recognizes the potential value of nonpe-
cuniary relief in its litigation incentive structure. Delaware courts award legal 
fees to plaintiffs’ attorneys on the basis of lawsuits that provide nonpecuniary 
relief to the plaintiff class as long as that relief constitutes a corporate benefit. 
Nevertheless, Delaware courts recognize that the value of nonpecuniary benefits 
is difficult to quantify. Courts refer to the value of amendments and supplemen-
tal disclosures as “qualitative” and “intangible,” meaning essentially, that they 
cannot be measured. Without a metric for the value of nonpecuniary relief, it is 
difficult to determine the utility of the litigation and, in particular, to determine 
the extent to which courts, by awarding fees, should encourage the pursuit of 
litigation that tends to result in nonpecuniary settlements.
In this Article, we offer a way out of the impasse. We propose that the val-
ue of nonpecuniary relief in merger settlements be measured by its effect on 
shareholder voting. Because nonpecuniary relief takes three basic forms in the 
context of merger litigation—settlements that amend the terms of the merger 
(amendment settlements), settlements that provide only supplemental disclo-
sures (disclosure-only settlements) and settlements which provide for an increase 
in the merger consideration (consideration increase settlements)—we sepa-
rate each and test their effect on how shareholders vote on the deal. Our core 
hypotheses are as follows: First, because amendments should improve the terms 
of the merger or the quality of the procedures used in reaching a final agree-
ment, amendment settlements should increase shareholder voting in favor of the 
merger. In contrast, because forced disclosures should produce negative informa-
tion about the merger, we hypothesize that disclosure-only settlements should 
decrease shareholder voting in favor of the merger.
Our empirical tests draw upon a hand-collected sample of 453 mergers involv-
ing publicly traded target companies announced from 2005 and completed 
through 2012 along with proxy-voting statistics provided to us by Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) over the same period. Although in theory it would 
be best to test the effect of nonpecuniary relief by comparing shareholder votes 
before and after the settlement, such a comparison is not possible because share-
holder votes are tallied only once, when the polls are closed at the meeting to 
approve the merger agreement. As a result, our tests take the form of regressions. 
Our regression analyses compare votes cast in cases involving amendment settle-
ments and disclosure-only settlements to votes in other mergers.
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Our tests yield two main empirical results. First, we find weak support for our 
first hypothesis—that is, that amendment settlements increase shareholder 
voting in favor of a transaction. Second, and more importantly, we find no 
support for the second hypothesis—that is, disclosure-only settlements do not 
appear to affect shareholder voting in any way. We also find only weak evidence 
that consideration-increase settlements increase shareholder voting in favor of 
a transaction. To gauge the significance of our findings, we also tested the effect 
of several other variables on shareholder voting, including transaction size and 
premium paid, the proxy advisors’ recommendation and institutional ownership, 
and the jurisdiction of settlement. We find that transaction value and the proxy 
advisors’ recommendation have a significant effect on shareholder voting; the 
other variables do not.
The implication of these findings is clear. If disclosure settlements do not 
affect shareholder voting, it is difficult to argue that they benefit shareholders. 
Accordingly, the basis upon which courts are awarding fees to plaintiffs’ counsel 
disappears. Moreover, the illusory benefit of supplemental disclosure must be 
weighed against the clear cost of merger litigation—including litigation ex-
pense as well as delay and uncertainty. Accordingly, our article proposes that the 
Delaware courts stop awarding fees for disclosure-only settlements. This reform 
would reduce the incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring weak merger cases. 
To the extent that merger disclosures are meaningfully deficient, we argue that 
plaintiffs should be required to litigate challenges to disclosure quality under 
the federal securities laws. This would have the effect of efficiently specializing 
litigation challenges while reducing plaintiffs’ counsel’s ability to use disclosure 
as a negotiating point to justify a fee award.
In connection with Griffith’s peppercorn settlement article, he filed an amicus 
brief objecting to the settlement arising from a stockholder class action chal-
lenging real estate database company Zillow’s acquisition of competitor Trulia.
The Court has asked for supplemental briefing on two issues. The first is what 
standard to apply in evaluating the relief in a disclosure-only settlement. The 
second is how to evaluate the scope of the release granted in such settlements.
These issues cannot be considered in isolation or without reference to the broad-
er context in which they have arisen: the explosion of lawsuits filed in the wake 
of merger announcements and the devolution of those claims into “ritualized 
quasi-litigation.” The ritual is now well known. Virtually every deal is challenged 
in litigation. The vast majority of these cases end in settlement, but the payment 
of additional consideration to the shareholder class is vanishingly rare. Instead, 
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the typical settlement results in a package of supplemental disclosures for which 
defendants receive a broad release, variously characterized by this Court as  
“global,” “intergalactic,” “solar-systemic,” and “Jovian.”
The ritual is a problem for the shareholders of Delaware corporations, for the 
corporations themselves, and for the Court. Through it, shareholders are forced 
to trade potentially meaningful rights for essentially meaningless consideration 
and bear the cost through a deadweight loss to the cost of capital. Corporate 
defendants are faced with a “deal tax” on every transaction. And the credibility 
of the Court is undermined as it is transformed from a public forum for deciding 
cases and controversies on the basis of clear substantive and procedural rules into 
an agency charged with endorsing the product of an opaque private bargaining 
process, a role Lon Fuller characterized as “contract parasitic on adjudication.” 
It is only “when a party has a genuine claim of injury” that the “judicial process 
should be invoked.” The ritual undermines the integrity of Delaware law, imply-
ing that not only must judicial process be invoked in every announced merger, 
but also that there is no exit from such claims except settlement. 
The devolution of merger litigation is not random or accidental. It is the sys-
tematic response of rational actors to the set of choices put before them. This 
choice set was created by practices that have effectively removed any substantial 
merit screen from merger cases. These practices can be summarized in two rough 
heuristics. First, if disclosure violations are alleged, then expedition is necessary 
to protect the shareholder franchise. Second, if the parties have agreed to a 
settlement without obvious, smoky-room collusion, a “peppercorn” is sufficient 
consideration to approve the settlement and provide defendants a broad release.
The interaction of these two heuristics turns every merger case into a strong can-
didate for expedition and, because of the risk thereby created to the underlying 
transaction, a strong candidate for settlement. However, because no vigorous  
litigation has preceded settlement, it is highly unlikely that the resulting settle-
ment will correlate to the untested merits of the case. “Sweetheart settlements,” 
in which class counsel sell out meritorious claims to harvest an easy fee, and 
“strike suit settlements,” in which class counsel file non-meritorious claims for 
nuisance fees, are equally likely.
To address this nest of problems the Court should: First, recognize that changed 
circumstances no longer support present practices. Second, apply existing 
Supreme Court precedent to inject a meaningful merits filter at the time of 
settlement. Third, fashion a rule of proportionality between relief and release. 
Fourth, consider further procedural correctives to move the merit filter forward 
and encourage earlier termination of non-meritorious claims.
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Sex workers in Africa regularly  
face stigma, discrimination,  
and violence. 
Chi Mgbako’s book, To Live Freely in This World:  
Sex Worker Activism in Africa, advocates for African 
sex workers as members of a strong, global workers’ 
rights movement. Contrary to mainstream depictions, 
especially in the media, Mgbako’s book portrays  
these workers as rational individuals fighting for  
basic human and labor rights.
Her work supports the movement by showing that 
•	 violence is not inherent to prostitution;
•	 the source of widespread abuse is structural;
•	 criminalizing sex work marginalizes sex workers and limits their  
labor rights, resulting in abuse in the form of state-sanctioned violence 
and discrimination; and 
•	 across Africa, sex workers’ rights movements continue to gain 
momentum, including law reform efforts to decriminalize sex work. 
Mgbako’s work, based on more than 200 interviews across seven  
countries, shines light on the vibrant sex workers’ rights movement in  
Africa, revealing people with dignity charting their own future rather  
than waiting for a savior, as traditional accounts previously theorized. 
Chi Adanna Mgbako
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To Live Freely in This World:  
Sex Worker Activism in Africa
NYU Press, 2016
Introduction
“We Have Voices”
There’s really no such thing as the ‘voiceless.’ There are only the deliberately 
silenced, or the preferably unheard. 
    – Arundhati Roy 
Studies from throughout Africa consistently document disturbing abuses 
against female and male sex workers, cisgender1 and transgender, in the form 
of endemic police abuse; abuses by clients who take advantage of sex workers’ 
lack of access to justice after violent victimization; lack of labor rights result-
ing in unsafe working conditions; and social stigma, leading to discrimination 
in healthcare services.2 Why are these horrendous abuses so rampant? 
Anti-prostitution scholars and activists have long argued that every ex-
change of sexual services for payment is an inherently violent and coercive 
act that degrades women. For many of these advocates, the idea of a consent-
ing adult sex worker is inconceivable.3 They implicitly and explicitly argue 
that trafficking and sex work are one and the same, a dangerous conflation 
that has led to abuses of sex workers in the name of fighting trafficking.4 
Despite anti-prostitution advocates’ claims, when we actually listen to the 
multiplicity of sex worker voices and acknowledge that we can’t universalize 
their experiences, we learn that violence is not inherent to prostitution. 
In the economically unequal world of global capitalism, where the vast majority 
of workers have highly limited economic opportunities, some people do in fact 
make the rational decision to pursue sex work. The abuses they experience in 
that work don’t occur because the selling of sexual services is necessarily de-
grading or dehumanizing. The source of the abuses lies elsewhere. It is, instead, 
structural: Laws and policies criminalizing sex work deeply marginalize sex 
workers, their clients, and the industry; push sex work underground and into 
the shadows; and ensure that sex workers have little power over their labor, 
therefore remaining vulnerable to abuse and discrimination. Throughout 
Africa and the rest of the world, where most governments criminalize sex work 
and most societies stigmatize sex workers, this continues to be the case.5 
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And yet in the midst of the chronic violence, grinding stigma, and unrelent-
ing discrimination that accompany criminalization, something surprising and 
beautiful has emerged. African sex workers, refusing to swallow the bitterness 
of their suffering, have sparked a sex workers’ rights movement that is spread-
ing like a brushfire through the continent. Theirs is the latest manifestation of 
a global sex worker movement, birthed in Europe and the United States over 
forty years ago, that has spread throughout the world.6 It is also the continuation 
of a rich tradition of informal local sex worker activism. These vibrant, defiant 
voices should not be ignored, and yet too often they are indeed disregarded. 
In the spring of 2005, when I was in my final semester as a graduate student 
at Harvard Law School, I took a seminar course on international women’s 
rights. I especially loved the opportunity to hear directly from women’s rights 
activists—the Ghanaian campaigner fighting against the harmful traditional 
practice of female genital cutting, the Nepalese lawyer advocating for wom-
en’s increased political participation in her country, the U.S. human rights 
defender championing reproductive freedom. But our class on prostitution 
was different. Gone were the voices directly from affected communities that 
had so illuminated other parts of the course. Instead, we read a slew of arti-
cles by The New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof on what struck me 
as his misguided efforts to liberate “sex slaves” from brothels in South East 
Asia by purchasing them.7 We read nothing from sex workers themselves. 
I was a young budding human rights advocate, and I believed fierce-
ly in the notion of individual and community agency. The silencing of 
these voices unsettled me. Were sex workers the world over incapable of 
speaking about the complexity of their own lives? That day in class I in-
stinctively knew that these voices must exist, and I vowed to find them. 
A decade later, as a human rights professor and advocate who works in sol-
idarity with sex worker activists and has a special affinity for the African 
sex work context due in part to my Nigerian heritage and professional 
Africanist leanings, I’ve experienced firsthand the vitality of the global sex 
workers’ rights movement. Despite attempts by anti-prostitution advo-
cates to discredit the movement,8 sex worker activism continues to spread 
in Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America, North America, and the 
Caribbean. And now in Africa as well, red umbrellas are aflutter.
Anti-prostitution advocates may think that the sex workers want nothing more 
than to be rescued from prostitution. But if they are asked, they will tell you 
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that what they want is respect for their human rights. A chorus of sex work-
ers’ voices is rising throughout the continent. South African sex workers are 
leading a sophisticated national legal reform campaign to decriminalize sex 
work. Ugandan sex worker activists have withstood fierce government crack-
downs. In Namibia, the movement is forming strong alliances with LGBT 
activists. Brothel-based sex workers in Nigeria, taking to the streets of Lagos in 
the hundreds, have protested unfair working conditions. Sex worker activists 
throughout Africa are demanding the end of criminalization, and the recogni-
tion and protection of their human rights to safe working conditions, health 
and justice services, and lives free from violence, discrimination, and stigma. 
These efforts are bolstered by the fact that in the past few years, influential labor, 
global health, human rights, and women’s rights organizations have embraced 
sex workers’ rights. United Nations agencies have issued guiding principles 
and studies espousing the language and goals of the sex workers’ rights move-
ment. The World Health Organization (WHO) has encouraged organizations 
to “[s]upport community mobilization of sex workers to respond to violence 
and discrimination,” and in 2012 and 2014, WHO released guidelines urging 
states to work towards the decriminalization of sex work.9 In 2012, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA) released an important survey regarding sex work and the law 
in almost fifty countries in Asia and the Pacific that called for the removal of 
punitive laws related to the sex industry.10 In 2013, the United Nations Entity 
for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women) recog-
nized “the right of all sex workers to choose their work.”11 In its Guidance Note 
on HIV and Sex Work, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
(UNAIDS) clearly argues that discrimination, stigmatization, and harassment 
from law enforcement increase sex workers’ vulnerability to HIV/AIDS, and 
in a 2014 briefing note they assert that: “Criminalisation of sex workers or 
their clients negates the right to individual self-determination, autonomy and 
agency.”12 In 2014, the International Labour Organization (ILO) released a 
report stressing the importance of sex worker peer education programs.13 United 
Nations Special Rapporteurs on extreme poverty, the right to health, and the 
right to be free from torture have all laid human rights violations against sex 
workers squarely at the door of criminalization, stigma, and discrimination.14 
International independent experts in global health have also joined the influ-
ential voices supporting the goals of the sex workers’ rights movement. The 
Lancet, one of the world’s most respected general medical journals, has de-
cried the marginalization of sex workers in global HIV efforts, and in a July 
2012 editorial further argued that the “conflation of sex work with human 
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trafficking, and the disregard of sex work as work, has meant that sex work-
ers’ rights have not been properly recognised.”15 The Lancet also released a 
series of scientific reports in 2014 arguing that the decriminalization of sex 
work could significantly reduce HIV infections in female sex workers.16 In 
a 2012 watershed report, leading health and human rights experts sitting 
on the Global Commission on HIV and the Law, including distinguished 
HIV/AIDS activist Stephen Lewis and U.S. Congresswoman Barbara Lee, 
powerfully argued that: “Sex workers are not fully recognised as persons be-
fore the law and are rendered incapable of holding or exercising the range of 
human rights available to others.”17 They continued by noting that: “Where 
sex workers organise, where the police don’t harass them and they are free to 
avail themselves of quality HIV services, sex workers have lower rates of STIs, 
more economic power and a greater ability to get education for their chil-
dren.”18 The Commission called for the full decriminalization of sex work.19 
In 2013, Human Rights Watch, the world’s leading international human rights 
organization, publicly affirmed that they had “concluded that ending the crim-
inalization of sex work is critical to achieving public health and human rights 
goals,” and in their 2014 World Report they reiterated their “push for decrimi-
nalizing voluntary sex work by adults.”20 The Open Society Foundations, one of 
the largest grant-making foundations in the world, has long supported grassroots 
sex workers’ rights activism, including the campaign to decriminalize sex work  
in South Africa.21 
The global membership of the Association for Women’s Rights in Development 
(AWID), which every four years convenes one of the largest global gatherings of 
women’s rights activists outside of the UN, for the first time ever in 2013 elected 
an out sex worker, Kthi Win, to its international board of directors.22 This 
milestone followed Kthi’s appearance at the 2012 AWID international forum in 
Istanbul where before a hushed audience of over 2,000 women’s rights advocates 
from over 140 countries, with quiet confidence Kthi bravely stated: “The key 
demand of the sex workers’ movement … is simple. We demand that sex work is 
recognized as work. But we have one other key demand, specific to certain parts 
of the women’s movement. We demand that we are not treated as victims.”23 
The membership’s election of Kthi to its board following this appearance was a 
ringing endorsement of the idea that sex workers’ rights and feminism are not 
mutually exclusive. On June 2, 2014, in honor of the International Day for Sex 
Workers, the Global Coalition on Women and AIDS (GCWA), an international 
consortium of civil society groups focusing on women’s rights, released a strong 
statement that called for “transformative laws which protect sex workers.”24 
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The fact that the global health and human rights communities are increas-
ingly reaching a consensus about the deep harms of sex work criminalization 
is significant—the more that evidence and clear-sighted reasoning inform 
the debate, and not emotion, the more lives will be saved. These positive 
developments are proof that sex worker activists in Africa and throughout 
the world are making important, persuasive assertions, and garnering ac-
knowledgement and support from influential players on the world stage. 
To Live Freely in This World is the first book to fully document the history and 
continuing activism of the sex workers’ rights movement in Africa, which is 
the newest and most vibrant manifestation of the global sex workers’ rights 
struggle.25 Based on participant observation and in-depth interviews with over 
200 sex workers, activists, and allies in seven African countries as diverse as 
Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda, I 
explore how this young movement is blossoming, confronting challenges, and 
contributing an African perspective to feminist debates around sex work.26 
Although anti-prostitution advocates have long claimed that all sex workers are 
inherently violated people in need of rescue by virtuous saviors, this book tells 
a different story. It serves as powerful proof that African sex worker activists are 
determining their social and political fate through strategic, informed choices. 
This book also seeks to help fill a large void in both sex work studies and 
African feminist scholarship. The extensive body of literature pertaining to 
sex workers’ rights has heavily focused on the United States, Europe, Asia, 
and Asia-Pacific, and has lacked a comprehensive study on sex work activism 
in Africa. African feminist scholars have largely remained silent on the issue 
of sex work with a few notable exceptions. Sylvia Tamale, a Ugandan legal 
scholar focusing on African sexualities, has argued that the patriarchal state 
criminalizes sex work as a way of controlling African women’s sexual activity. 
She contends that criminalization has been a public health disaster that ig-
nores African women’s economic realities, and she champions the need for a 
progressive African feminist agenda that embraces the decriminalization of sex 
work as a response to the patriarchal state’s injurious nature and indignities.27 
Marlise Richter, a South African scholar focusing on sexual and reproductive 
health and rights, has argued for an Africanist sex-positive28 approach to sex 
work and bemoans the lack of African feminist engagement with the issue, 
especially in light of devastating rates of HIV/AIDS in sex worker communities 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the continent most heavily affected by the epidemic:
It is curious that, while the prevalence of female sex workers 
and proportion of female sex workers to the general population 
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are higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other region of 
the world, African feminisms have not grappled much with the 
issue of sex work. This is of particular concern against the back-
drop of the staggering prevalence of HIV amongst sex workers 
in Africa—sex workers generally have a 10-20 fold higher HIV 
prevalence than the general population—and the ongoing 
human rights violations against sex workers. Sex work and sex 
workers’ rights are conspicuously absent from most discussions 
on gender in Africa, and many feminist and gender practi-
tioners avoid the issue like the plague—thus perpetuating the 
stigma and silence that surround the sex industry in Africa.29
Although leading African feminists such as Hope Chigudu and Solome 
Nakaweesi-Kimbugwe have stood in staunch solidarity with African sex work-
ers and played significant roles in the early development of sex workers’ rights 
movements in East Africa,30 African feminists’ general silence regarding sex work 
has been louder than these examples of solidarity. This study, which centralizes 
African sex workers’ understanding of their work, feminist analysis, and fight 
for their rights, is not only an act of solidarity with them but seeks to address 
the gap in feminist knowledge regarding sex work in the African context.
Although this book focuses on the struggle for sex workers’ rights in Africa, 
it is important to note that abuses against sex workers aren’t confined to 
the Global South—they are equally prevalent in the Global North. In New 
York City where I live, sex workers routinely experience abuse and lack ac-
cess to justice when they are the victims of violence. In one study, eighty 
percent of street-based sex workers reported being the victims of violence 
and noted that police refused to take crimes committed against them seri-
ously.31 Sex workers have experienced police confiscation of their condoms 
from Washington D.C. to Russia.32 The International Day to End Violence 
Against Sex Workers was originally inspired by the serial murders of sex 
workers in Seattle, Washington, that went unsolved for decades.33 Studies 
have also documented entrenched violence and discrimination against sex 
workers in Britain, France, and other countries in the Global North.34 
Elsewhere in the world, police abuse of sex workers is also ubiquitous: 
In a survey of 200 sex workers in eleven countries in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 41.7 percent of respondents reported physical assault by 
law enforcement.35 A survey of brothel-based and mobile Cambodian sex 
workers revealed that over 57 percent reported being raped by police offi-
cers.36 And in 2013, Human Rights Watch released a report that received 
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global media attention for its documentation of widespread police tor-
ture, beatings, and arbitrary detention of sex workers in China.37
I chose to highlight the African context not because human rights abuses against 
African sex workers are unique, far from it, but because their response to this 
abuse is colored by an activism that is young and robust and therefore deeply 
compelling. In only the past several years, the African branch of the global sex 
workers’ rights movement has exploded. Through the fresh stories of African 
sex worker activists, the book will highlight this unique moment. And by 
locating this counter-narrative in the Global South, it will challenge disempow-
ering and one-dimensional depictions of “degraded Third World prostitutes” 
that are often the focus of anti-prostitution advocates’ savior impulses.38 
The book tells the story of the African sex workers’ rights movement by ex-
ploring the following themes: African sex worker advocates’ perspectives on 
long-standing feminist debates regarding prostitution, including their insistence 
on the acceptance of sex work as labor and the recognition of their human 
agency even amid limited economic opportunities (chapter 1); how social 
stigma and the criminalization of sex work result in human rights abuses against 
African sex workers, including police abuse, denial of access to justice, client 
abuse, lack of labor rights, and healthcare discrimination (chapter 2); and how 
whorephobia and sex work criminalization intersect with transphobia, ho-
mophobia, trafficking and sex work conflation, HIV-stigma, and discriminatory 
laws to create multiple, overlapping stigmas against African queer and trans 
sex workers, migrant sex workers, and HIV-positive sex workers (chapter 3).
The book then traces the history of African sex worker activism in countries 
at different stages of organizing, highlighting informal and formal political 
resistance, and the movement’s successes and struggles in creating both visionary 
leaders and active constituents (chapter 4); the role of intersectional movement 
building with similarly marginalized communities, including feminist, LGBT, 
HIV/AIDS, labor, harm reduction, and anti-poverty groups (chapter 5); and  
the movement’s key organizing strategies—health and legal services for diverse 
sex workers, community outreach to advance the notion of sex work as labor in 
the public imagination, and rights-based law reform efforts to decriminalize  
sex work (chapter 6).
I also explore the tactics and subsequent harms of political opposition from 
anti-prostitution activists who champion ineffective and stigmatizing reha-
bilitation programs targeting sex workers, conservative religious leaders who 
characterize sex work as both immoral and un-African, and African politicians 
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wielding what I term “political whorephobia,” a strategy that seeks to crack down 
on gender dissidents (chapter 7). The epilogue highlights African sex worker 
activists’ increasing engagement with the larger global sex workers’ rights move-
ment, including their development of innovative South-South collaborations. 
I share my on-the-ground observations of sex worker activism in action and 
provide context and analysis as we explore the themes above. But it is the 
stories of sex workers’ journeys into activism collected during my interviews 
in African cities and small towns that are the book’s beating heart. Several 
of these stories are presented as extended first-person narratives.39 I chose to 
include these first-person narratives and spotlight many sex workers’ voices by 
quoting judiciously from my interviews because while I hope I’m considered 
an ally of the sex worker movement, I’m not a sex worker. And too often non-
sex workers take it upon themselves to speak for sex workers when they are 
fully capable of doing so themselves. By elevating and centering their voices, I 
hope to both create a platform for them and speak in solidarity with them. 
Many of the sex worker activists profiled in this book have experienced horren-
dous abuse. This reality has often led to the dismissal of sex workers as “broken 
people” whose voices we can ignore. But people who have experienced abuse 
are not bereft of agency. A history of personal trauma may—or may not—di-
rectly inform a person’s economic choices, but it should never be used as an 
excuse to negate their right and ability to speak about the truth of their own 
lives. There are no broken people in this book. I hope the reader will see the 
radiating strength of the African sex workers who bring it to life and who were 
brave enough to allow me to listen and help bear witness. And I hope that by 
highlighting the deep injustice of the legal and social universe in which African 
sex workers live, the reader will also come to understand that even those sex 
workers who aren’t “strong,” who haven’t “overcome” the obstacles of their 
past or the abuses they currently face, who have no activist stories of triumph 
to share, are just as deserving of rights by simple virtue of their humanity. 
Because the interviews in this study often did reveal extreme instances of abuse,  
I ensured that I didn’t include stories simply to elicit an emotional response from 
the reader by adhering to the following standard when determining whether  
to feature a particular case in the book: 1) The interviewee’s story highlights a  
recurring theme regarding African sex workers’ political and social realities,  
and 2) it creates knowledge about the link between sex work, human agency, 
criminalization, and the political struggle for dignity and justice. To include 
stories that failed this standard would have been to exploit the interviewees by 
participating in the cynical selling of suffering. 
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In order to gather the stories for this book, I conducted a wide range of 
interviews and engaged in participant observation during fieldwork in 
December 2012, March 2013, June through July 2013, November 2013, 
and October 2014, focusing on seven countries and twelve field sites in a 
mix of urban, semi-urban, and semi-rural areas in order to speak with a va-
riety of sex workers in different settings. Urban sites were an important 
focus because they are hotbeds of sex worker activism. But it was also nec-
essary to focus on non-urban areas to gain an understanding of how the 
movement is developing across different locations. Sites included Cape 
Town, South Africa; Windhoek, Namibia; Gaborone, Francistown, and 
Kazungula in Botswana; Kampala and Mijera in Uganda; Nairobi and Thika 
in Kenya; Quatre Bornes and Port Louis in Mauritius; and Lagos, Nigeria. 
I chose the book’s seven focus countries—Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, 
and South Africa in Southern Africa; Kenya and Uganda in East Africa; and 
Nigeria in West Africa—in order to ensure geographic diversity and to high-
light country movements that are at different stages of sex work organizing.40 
Although an in-depth analysis of the focus countries’ social and political his-
tories is beyond the scope of this book, the following brief country contexts 
for several of the field sites may prove useful in framing the developmental 
trajectory of sex work activism highlighted in this study: Countries like South 
Africa and Kenya, with vibrant civil societies and rich histories of activism 
against oppression (in South Africa against the apartheid state, and in Kenya 
against British colonialism), tend to provide easier launching pads for sex 
worker-led movements because of deeply ingrained histories of protest in the 
national psyches. In South Africa, for instance, sex workers I interviewed often 
had personal backgrounds as anti-apartheid activists and referred to their sex 
work activism as partly inspired by their previous struggles against the racist 
apartheid state. In Kenya, there is historical evidence that prostitutes played a 
role in the Mau Mau uprising against British colonial rule,41 creating a historical 
precedent for contemporary grassroots Kenyan sex worker activism. Countries 
with weaker civil societies and without strong histories of social activism, like 
Mauritius and Botswana, provide less fertile ground for the fast rise of sex work-
er-led movements. Sex work activism in countries like Uganda and Nigeria 
must be understood in the context of their highly publicized and serious legal 
and social crackdowns against those viewed as gender and sexual deviants. 
I gained access to sex worker interviewees with the assistance of sex workers’ 
rights organizations such as Sisonke and the Sex Worker Education and Advocacy 
Taskforce (SWEAT) in South Africa, Sisonke Botswana, the Kenya Sex Workers 
Alliance (KESWA), Women’s Organization Network for Human Rights 
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Advocacy (WONETHA) in Uganda, and Rights Not Rescue Trust (RNRT) and 
Voices of Hope Trust in Namibia, as well as HIV and harm reduction organiza-
tions such as Chrysalide and Prévention Information et Lutte contre le Sida (PILS) 
in Mauritius. I found that once these organizations had vouched for me, the sex 
workers they put me in touch with were incredibly open and willing to speak 
with me about their experiences. These sex workers would then, in turn, intro-
duce me to more sex workers. It also helped that since 2007, as director of a law 
school-based human rights program, I’ve worked on projects with well-known 
sex workers’ rights organizations in India, Kenya, South Africa, Malawi, and the 
United States. When potential interviewees learned of this work, they identified 
me as someone who has contributed to efforts aimed at strengthening sex work 
communities, which made them more comfortable sharing their stories with me. 
Although the term “sex work” can and does encompass other actors within the sex 
industry, including porn actors and exotic dancers, African sex workers who are 
engaged in what is traditionally viewed as prostitution—the in-person physical 
exchange of sexual services for money or goods—dominate sex worker activism 
on the continent, and I focused my interviews on this population. In total, I in-
terviewed 211 people for this study, including 163 adult sex workers (75 percent 
cisgender female; 18 percent transgender female; 7 percent cisgender male; and 4 
percent migrant). The majority of the sex worker interviewees (73 percent) were 
involved in formal sex worker activism, and nearly all were engaged in informal re-
sistance to criminalization. Their workplaces reflected the diversity of the African 
sex industry: street-based sex work; venue-based sex work in bars, nightclubs, ho-
tels, large-scale brothels, and small-scale brothels often operating under the guise 
of massage parlors; independent sex work out of private homes; and sex work 
in border towns. I conducted interviews in various venues, sensitive to comfort 
and confidentiality for interviewees, including on the streets and in cars, broth-
els, hotels, restaurants, and the offices of sex workers’ rights organizations. I also 
interviewed 48 UN officials, academics, non-governmental organization (NGO) 
workers, lawyers, and health workers who work with sex work communities. Many 
of the interviews were conducted individually, though some were conducted 
in groups or pairs, and most were tape-recorded with the interviewees’ permis-
sion.42 My graduate research assistants and I transcribed the audio recordings.
Along with formal interviews, I observed and participated in sex worker activ-
ism in action, including sex worker protest marches in South Africa and Kenya; 
human rights trainings in Kenya; “Creative Space” workshops in South Africa; 
and health and social outreach to sex workers on the streets and in indoor 
venues, such as massage parlors and brothels, in Mauritius and South Africa. 
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I have changed the names of brothels, hotels, massage parlors, and clubs 
that sex workers reference in their interviews. I have also used pseudonyms 
for most of the sex worker interviewees. However, high-profile country 
movement leaders who have already revealed their true identities via na-
tional and international media and other public fora, and whose work has 
been essential to the development of formal African sex worker activism, 
almost always wanted me to use their real names, which I have done. 
Here are just a few of the activists you will meet in the pages that follow: 
Duduzile Dlamini, a charismatic leader of the South African sex worker 
movement, deftly convinces members of South Africa’s politically powerful 
national trade union that sex workers are also workers doing the best they 
can to provide for themselves and their families and are deserving of rights. 
Mama Africa, the mother of the sex worker movement in Namibia, helps 
tell the story of setbacks faced by fledgling sex worker organizing in that 
southern African nation through a remembrance of the short, powerful life 
and untimely death of Abel Shinana—a lost, but unforgotten leader in the 
Namibia sex worker movement. John Mathenge, a Kenyan activist with a 
bracing confidence who has become the face and voice of male sex worker 
activism in the country, stars in a nationally televised documentary illuminat-
ing and validating the lives of male sex workers. Daisy Nakato, long a leader 
in the Ugandan movement, helps tell the story of a severe government crack-
down on sex worker organizing that threatens to close a drop-in center that 
provides health and human rights services to sex workers in Gulu in north-
ern Uganda. She speaks of how Ugandan sex workers fight back against this 
oppression, and because of their courage, the drop-in center still stands.
The progressive movement of history, the expansive realization of rights, is 
always, at its heart, a story about ordinary men and women who deeply and 
unwaveringly believe in the immovable core of their humanity. It is about  
people who have been relegated to the margins of society righteously claiming 
the center—an ancient but eternally important endeavor. This book seeks to 
explore that journey through the fresh lens of sex worker activism in Africa  
while pushing back against the dangerous notion that all sex workers want to  
be rescued from sex work. 
To Live Freely in This World focuses on the strength and creativity of sex work-
er activists like Duduzile, Mama Africa, John, and Daisy, the identities of 
resistance they’ve formed in response to criminalization and stigma, and the 
luminous, defiant social movement they’re building. Their collective agen-
cy will pour through the pages of this book. And I hope in the face of that 
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agency, policymakers, scholars, activists, students, and concerned readers will 
choose to engage as partners in the struggle for sex workers’ rights and not 
as would-be saviors. This is a book about communities saving themselves by 
demanding their rights. Ultimately it is a universal story about how those who 
are most legally and socially ostracized fight back—with dignity and hope.
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There are 2.2 million people in 
United States prisons.
John Pfaff’s data-driven research dispels myths  
used to explain the unprecedented 40-year boom  
in U.S. incarceration.
Chief among them:
•	 The War on Drugs drives prison growth.
•	 Most prisoners are incarcerated for nonviolent crimes.
•	 Longer sentences are the major force driving up incarceration rates.
•	 The “criminal justice system” is a coherent entity.
•	 The politics of crime are uniquely dysfunctional.
 
Pfaff demonstrates the significant shortcomings with each of these 
commonly accepted ideas and then posits a novel theory to explain  
the rise in the U.S. prison population.
John Pfaff
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The Complicated Economics of 
Prison Reform
114 Michigan Law Review 951–981 (2016)
Introduction
By now, the stratospheric, forty-year rise in the U.S. prison population is well known. From the mid-1970s to 2010, the U.S. prison population steadily and relentlessly rose from around 250,000 to 1.6 million; the incarceration rate from around 120 per 100,000 to 510 per 100,000 
(and to over 700 per 100,000 when counting those locked up in jails as well as 
prisons). It was a surge unprecedented in American history, and unseen else-
where in the world. The U.S. incarceration rate in the 1970s was comparable to 
those in Europe and Canada. But by the 2010s, the United States had earned the 
dubious distinction of being home to 5% of the world’s population but nearly 
25% of the world’s prisoners.
In 2010, however, for the first time in four decades, the U.S. prison population 
began to decline. The drop has not been great—just under 3%—and some ob-
servers predict that total populations could still rise by as much as 3% by 2018. 
But the decline has nonetheless been remarkable, not just because it ended years 
of constant growth, but because it reflected a rare moment of true bipartisanship. 
At both the state and federal levels, Democrats and Republicans alike advocated 
for reforms aimed at restraining or even reducing prison populations. Solidly 
blue states like California and deeply red ones like Georgia and Mississippi en-
acted significant reforms, and both houses of Congress have introduced reform 
bills with bipartisan sponsorship.
A major question reformers raise, however, is how long will this bipartisan moment 
last? Many find the timing of reforms—most of which followed the 2008 financial 
crisis—not coincidental. The assumption is that conservative support for reform 
is driven primarily by the desire to save money during a time of tight state budgets 
and low crime rates. The obvious fear is that if the economy recovers, vital conser-
vative support may dissipate. And this fear is not unfounded: there was concerted 
talk about prison reform in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble popping in 2000, 
but as the economy recovered, reform efforts fell by the wayside.
Two recent books on prison growth directly address the relationship between 
penal change and economic conditions: Hadar Aviram’s Cheap on Crime and 
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Marie Gottschalk’s Caught. Aviram’s is the more optimistic of the two accounts, 
arguing that there is at least some potential in an economic-based reform effort. 
Gottschalk, on the other hand, fears not only that economic-based efforts could 
fail to lead to significant reforms, but that they could actually make prison life 
worse for inmates if states cut funding and support without cutting populations. 
Both books make many provocative points, but both also suffer from some 
surprising omissions. Ultimately, both books, and Gottschalk’s in particular, are 
likely too pessimistic about economic-based reform, although for reasons that 
neither book adequately addresses.
I focus on two major themes in this Review. First, what exactly is the relation-
ship between the current fiscal crisis and prison reform? While it is clear that 
the crisis has helped to push legislators and governors to enact some important 
reforms, it is perhaps unexpectedly unclear why this is. The fraction of state 
spending given to prisons is actually surprisingly low, suggesting that even in 
a time of tight state budgets, cutting back on prison populations will not help 
these budgets much. Instead, contrary to the narrative that both Aviram and 
Gottschalk provide, the story of post-crisis reform is likely more one of politics 
(and the political cover provided by the crisis) than of economic necessity. This 
could actually be a reason to be optimistic that reform efforts will survive an 
economic recovery.
The second issue I consider is narrower: the impact of private prison firms on 
prison reform. Both Aviram and Gottschalk view these firms, and their atten-
dant lobbying, as major threats to reform efforts. And the fear is understandable. 
These firms earn profits off the number of inmates they hold, so they have an 
incentive to lobby hard to keep those numbers high. At first blush their lobbying 
efforts appear significant. But upon closer inspection, this concern is overstated. 
The correlation between relying on private prisons and state prison growth is 
weak, and it is hard to isolate the marginal importance of private prison lobby-
ing from that by all the other often-public groups with incentives to push for 
tougher sentencing practices as well. Moreover, to the extent that private prisons 
do impede reform, the problem isn’t with their for-profit status … but with the 
poorly designed contracts that states sign with them. 
I. The Fiscal Crisis as an Opportunity for Reform
According to the conventional wisdom about the causes of and solutions to 
prison growth, the financial crisis that started in 2008 has created a major op-
portunity to implement real reforms. It is a logical assumption to make. Crime 
is at a forty-year low while correctional spending is at an all-time high, giving 
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legislatures a strong incentive to cut back on spending, and thus (perhaps!) 
on prison populations. Bolstering this claim is the fact that the first decline in 
total prison populations since 1973 occurred in 2010, with declines persisting 
through 2014 (despite a slight uptick in 2013).
Yet the reality of incarceration growth is often far more complicated than the 
conventional wisdom suggests,1 and both Aviram and Gottschalk confront the 
conventional account of fiscal crisis and reform head-on. At the same time, both 
Aviram and Gottschalk miss the extent to which, I think, the current fiscal-based 
reform effort is not actually about fiscal issues. The financial aspect of reform may 
be more of a smoke screen than it gets credit for, and once framed this way, there 
is more reason to be optimistic—and pessimistic—about the future of reform. 
But let us first look more closely at the concerns that Aviram and Gottschalk raise.
A. The Limited Power of Fiscal-Based Reform
As both Aviram and Gottschalk note, the total amount states have spent on 
corrections has risen in tandem with soaring incarceration rates. The nearly $50 
billion states spend on prisons is a striking number; county governments spend 
an additional $30 billion on jails (which yields the widely cited $80 billion). In 
an era of austerity and low crime, prison spending seems like a logical budget 
item to scale back.
[That number, however, needs context.] While $80 billion is vast in absolute 
value, it comes to only 2% of the $3.6 trillion that state and county governments 
spent in 2012; if we look at spending on corrections, policing, and the court 
system—to account for counties spending much more on policing than correc-
tions—then total criminal justice expenditures still come to just about $213 
billion, or slightly under 6% of total spending. In other words, as Gottschalk 
cautions, for as much as we spend on corrections, we might not spend enough for 
budgetary pressures to make much of a real difference.
1  For my previous criticisms of various aspects of this conventional wisdom, see generally John F. Pfaff, The War 
on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, Limited Legislative Options, 52 Harv. J. on Legis. 173 (2015); 
John F. Pfaff, Federal Sentencing in the States: Some Thoughts on Federal Grants and State Imprisonment, 66 Hastings 
L.J. 1567 (2015); John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom on Prison Growth 
is Wrong, and Where We Can Go from Here, 26 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 265 (2014); John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro 
Causes of Prison Growth, 28 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1239 (2011); John F. Pfaff, The Myths and Realities of Correctional 
Severity: Evidence from the National Corrections Reporting Program on Sentencing Practices, 13 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 
491 (2011); John F. Pfaff, The Durability of Prison Populations, 2010 U. Chi. Legal F. 7 3; John F. Pfaff, The Empirics 
of Prison Growth: A Critical Review and Path Forward, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 547 (2008); John F. Pfaff, 
Waylaid by a Metaphor: A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 Mich. L. Rev. 1087 (2013); John F. 
Pfaff, The Causes of Growth in Prison Admissions and Populations ( Jan. 23, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990508. 
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Moreover, the level of correctional spending has been fairly constant for a while 
now. … From the late 1970s to 1991, as both crime and prison populations were 
rising, so too was corrections’ share of the budget. But as crime leveled out in 
1991, corrections’ share did as well. [There is] some variation across states … But 
the basic story … is that correctional spending, as a share of the budget, has been 
stable and fairly low [at under 3% of state spending] for many years.
[There] are plenty of other reasons to assume that whatever sort of fiscal pres-
sures states feel will not translate into real reforms. First, … analysts consistently 
overstate the savings that come from cutting back on prison populations. The 
conventional estimate of savings-per-prisoner is the average cost of incarcerating 
someone, which is calculated by simply dividing total annual spending on cor-
rections by the total number of prisoners; estimates come out around $17,000 to 
$60,000, depending on the state. But a lot of correctional spending goes to fixed 
costs that do not change much when one prisoner is released; Gottschalk, for 
example, notes that as much as 75% of correctional spending is on salaries, and 
states are very good at not laying off guards, even when closing prisons.2 So the 
marginal cost savings from a one-inmate release are often as little as one-fifth the 
average cost, unless enough inmates are released to close a wing, thus laying off 
guards, cutting back on food and heating, etc.
Along these lines, … public-sector unions [also] pose a major threat to fiscal- 
based reforms. After all, if reforms need to justify themselves by pointing to 
savings, they will only work if they effectively cut payroll. And while the power 
of prison-guard unions is likely overstated, these unions will nonetheless resist re-
forms that threaten payroll and membership too deeply. And other public-sector 
lobbying groups will oppose reforms as well, such as the towns that hold at-risk-
of-closure prisons, as well as any legislators who depend on inmates to maintain 
their current districts. With insufficiently large amounts of budgetary dollars at 
stake, these groups are better able to defend their “turf.”
If the only way the budget crisis could influence prison growth was directly 
through its impact on the budget, I would share Aviram’s and Gottschalk’s 
skepticism that the 2008 crisis will lead to substantial reform. And it very well 
may not: as a general matter I expect that the reform movement will founder and 
underperform expectations for a wide array of reasons.3 But there is an import-
2  In 2012, for example, Pennsylvania closed two prisons but laid off only three guards in the process. Bret Bucklen 
(@kbucklen), Twitter (Mar. 2, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://twitter.com/kbucklen/status/572441442464993280. Bret 
Bucklen is currently the Chief of Projections and Population Statistics in the Pennsylvania Department of Correction’s 
Bureau of Planning, Research, Statistics, and Grants.
3  Most significantly … the insistence on aiming reforms primarily on “nonviolent drug offenders” misses the point 
that over half of all state prisoners are in prison for violent crimes, and that almost all long-serving inmates [have been 
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ant reason to push back against some of the wariness expressed by Aviram and 
Gottschalk. The recession may help fuel reform not because of economics, but 
because of politics. There are certain structural defects in the politics of crime that 
help explain why prison populations have boomed the way they have, and an 
economics-based reform effort has the rhetorical power to circumvent them in a 
way that may prove more durable than Aviram and Gottschalk suggest.
B. The Politics of Punishment
Both Aviram and Gottschalk tell a political story in which incarceration is a  
top-down-driven process. As Aviram states quite clearly: 
[T]he political turn to punitiveness and “tough on crime” 
stances was not an organic response to bottom-up public con-
cerns about rising crime rates. Rather, public awareness of the 
rise in crime rates was brought about by a concerted top-down 
governmental effort to draw attention to those rates.  
Or, as she puts it more bluntly elsewhere, “crime rates did not fuel mass incarcer-
ation[.]” [Gottschalk, too, clearly sees] rising punitiveness as a top-down policy 
choice motivated by issues other than crime … Aviram and Gottschalk are not 
alone in de-emphasizing crime. Michelle Alexander[, for example,] does the 
exact same thing in her widely read The New Jim Crow. … 
This is a peculiar flaw, and one that leads [many] astray in appreciating how the 
budget crisis and prison reform truly interact. Recent empirical work suggests 
that (1) popular (not elite) punitiveness closely tracks crime rates, and (2) incar-
ceration growth tracks these popular political attitudes.4 Taken together, these 
results suggest that the financial crisis can lead to real reform not because of the 
fiscal pressure it creates but because of the political cover it provides.
First, it is important to examine, if briefly, the relationship between rising crime 
and rising incarceration rates. The rise in both [violent and property crime] rates 
convicted of ] violent [crimes]. It will be impossible to impose deep cuts to U.S. prison populations without reforming 
how we manage [those convicted of violence], and no one is doing this yet. In fact, much of the rhetoric used to defend 
reforms for nonviolent offenders—“we are still keeping you safe by locking up the violent people!”—may foreclose 
reforms aimed at [people convicted of ] violent [crimes] in the future. 
4  A common critique of the crime-caused-prison-growth claim is that Canada and other European countries also 
saw steep rises in crime in the 1970s and 1980s but did not raise their incarceration rates in any comparable way. 
While true, all this demonstrates is that rising crime does not mechanistically guarantee rising prison populations. It 
says nothing about the claim that the reason why Americans decided to become more punitive was in no small part 
because of rising crime. So at one level rising incarceration is a policy choice, but perhaps one strongly influenced, or 
politically required, by (among other things) rising crime.
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[from 1960 to 1991] is striking, with violent crime rates rising by 563% and 
property crime rates (from a much higher baseline) by 319%. And even with 
crime steadily dropping since 1991, crime rates in 2014 remain substantially 
higher than they were in 1960.
In a recent study on the relationship between popular punitiveness and prison 
populations, the political scientist Peter Enns provides striking evidence that … 
points to errors in the elite-led story. Popular punitiveness, he finds, moves with 
the crime rate, and the rate of growth of this incarceration tracks that popular 
punitiveness. So as crime has fallen over the past twenty years, so too has the 
desire of the electorate to be tough on crime. 
And as the electorate has become less punitive, so too have politicians. The finan-
cial crisis thus allows conservative politicians the freedom to move away from a 
tough-on-crime position. As Enns notes … “the fiscal environment of the Great 
Recession allowed political elites who had previously advocated tough-on-crime 
positions to align their rhetoric with emerging public opinion without suffering 
a political cost with their conservative constituents.”
But why do politicians need cover? If the electorate is becoming less punitive, 
why can’t politicians “move” with them? Part of the answer might just be the 
nature of politics. Politicians can only move so much without seeming untrust-
worthy. [It’s likely, however,] tough-on-crime politicians have always also been at 
least nominally fiscally conservative, so the cost-cutting rhetoric allows them to 
move left (with the voter pool) without seeming to betray their principles.
Moreover, there is some intriguing and rarely cited evidence that politicians do 
not actually want to be tough on crime—or at least not as tough as we gener-
ally think—even when crime rates are high. Thomas Stucky and coauthors, for 
example, have generated results suggesting that while more conservative state 
legislatures tend to be more punitive, and while that effect has grown over time, 
a key mediating factor is electoral stability. The more secure the conservative 
majority—when the majority is better able to indulge in its (allegedly punitive) 
policy preferences—the less likely it is to be punitive. Only when elections be-
come tight and the majority is at risk do politicians become much more punitive. 
This suggests that punitiveness is more an electoral than a policy move.
Buttressing this idea are similar results produced by Rachel Barkow and 
Kathleen O’Neill, indicating that states are more likely to adopt sentencing 
commissions when, among other things, the legislative majority is more at risk. 
According to Stucky et al., politicians are more likely to be tough on crime when 
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electorally vulnerable, and according to Barkow and O’Neill, they are more likely 
to try to weaken their ability to act on the issue when—again—they are elector-
ally vulnerable. Taken together, these results are consistent with legislators who, 
in general, would rather not be punitive if they can avoid it. The crisis, then, may 
be more useful in the way it gives politicians the political flexibility to push back 
against punitiveness. 
There is another reason why politicians may need to mask genuine desires for 
less-punitive sanctions behind fiscal-based rhetoric, one that yields both optimis-
tic and pessimistic predictions about the future of reform. For voters, criminal 
justice is a low-information, high-salience (LIHS) issue, which just means that 
voters do not pay much attention to the day-to-day goings on of the criminal jus-
tice system and respond only to highly shocking, and highly idiosyncratic, cases. 
Unfortunately, in criminal justice contexts, this creates a strong, rational bias on 
the part of officials to be quite tough on crime.
In fact, LIHS likely helps explain one of the more durable puzzles in penal 
policy, namely that politicians are consistently harsher and less rehabilitative 
than multiple polls show the electorate to be. Are they just ignorant…—should 
we just educate them better about what “the people” want? Sometimes academ-
ics and other policymakers seem to adopt this attitude, but this is not the right 
way to think about the issue. Politicians are not more severe than the electorate 
because they do not understand it, but because they do. Voters profess a desire for 
rehabilitation in surveys but not in the voting booth. And LIHS is likely a major 
reason why.
While voters say that they favor rehabilitation, they do not pay close attention 
to the sorts of rehabilitative or nonincarcerative policies legislators, prosecutors, 
judges, and parole boards adopt or their general effectiveness. Instead, they react 
with anger at the inevitable errors that will take place—the could-have-been-
incarcerated-but-wasn’t defendant who goes on to commit a sufficiently awful 
subsequent crime that grabs the media’s attention. Thus policy actors bear most 
of the downside risk of leniency but get little of the upside benefit.
A similar risk does not apply to being punitive, however. Overincarceration is 
not punished to the same degree since it is much harder for voters to see it. It is 
easy to put a name and a face to both the preventable recidivist and his victim. It 
is much tougher to identify those who are locked up more than they need to be. 
Given this asymmetry in risks to the policymakers, it makes perfect sense that 
they would punish more than voters seem to desire.
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What does all this have to do with the credit crunch? Alternatives to incarcer-
ation still carry the same risks of error as before, but the fiscal crisis provides 
policy actors with a better excuse for them when they inevitably happen. Rather 
than having to defend the diversion from prison on the grounds that it was 
“good policy,” they can now say it was “economically essential.” To the extent 
more punitive voters—the voters more likely to react negatively to a failed 
diversion—are more … fiscally conservative, the “economically essential” excuse 
likely carries more weight. Thus, the current emphasis on fiscal restraint expands 
politicians’ ability to be less punitive, even if the actual impact of reduced incar-
ceration on the budget is slight.
To a point. Invoking financial necessity is likely far more effective when deal-
ing with diversion failures by inmates classified as “nonviolent” than by those 
classified as “violent.” And so it is not surprising to see that several years into 
the recession, almost no politicians [are] discussing changes to how we punish 
violent offenders, even though a majority of state inmates are classified as violent. 
Whatever room the crisis has provided politicians to debate how to punish non-
violent offenders, it has had much less of an effect when it comes to the (much 
more important) “violent” inmates.
Finally, even though fiscal tightness is often credited with driving current reform 
efforts, there’s reason to have at least some hope that reform—at least when it 
comes to nonviolent offenders—may continue even if the economy improves. 
[A]t least twenty-nine states have seen their prison populations fall between 
2008 and 2013—and their crime rates as well. Now, these results do not neces-
sarily mean that reducing prison populations causally reduced crime. … But for 
political purposes the correlation is likely sufficient to allow reformers, including 
conservative reformers, to claim that cutting prisons does not lead to increases 
in crime, which may provide them with the ability to push back against prison 
increases even as the economy recovers.
The story of fiscal crisis as political cover, however, also highlights a profound 
failure of the current reform efforts. … No reform proposal, either at the state 
or federal level, or even proposed by any of the myriad reformist groups, has 
attempted to address the structural problems LIHS voting raises. Reformers 
are simply trying to pass new laws without altering the system that produced 
the harsh laws in the first place. What is to keep that system from [overreacting 
again] at the next uptick in crime?
This is not idle speculation. In 1970, Congress abolished all mandatory minimum 
drug sentences when it passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
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Control Act of 1970. Then-Texas Representative George H.W. Bush even stood 
up to speak in defense of their abolition. Then Congress passed a host of new drug 
mandatories during the 1980s and 1990s, while Bush was vice president and then 
president. Now both houses of Congress are working on bills that would, to vary-
ing degrees, scale back or cut federal mandatory minimums. What is to say they 
won’t reintroduce mandatory minimums in 2025 if crime starts rising again?
State and local governments can certainly take steps to contain the risks posed by 
LIHS voting. Shifting from elected to appointed judges would help, for example, 
as could the use of fairly isolated sentencing commissions. Fleshing out exactly 
how to confront LIHS voting is beyond the scope of this Review, but it is worth 
noting that by failing to appreciate the pretextual use of the financial crisis by 
politicians, Aviram and Gottschalk tell stories that are at once too pessimistic 
(when they worry that corrections’ share of the budget isn’t enough to ensure 
real reform) and too optimistic (when they miss the more fundamental politi-
cal-structural defects that persist, and which perhaps explain why politicians may 
have needed to exploit the crisis in the first place).
II. Private Prisons and Prison Growth
The second major economics-of-punishment issue that both Aviram and 
Gottschalk discuss at length is the impact of private prisons on prison growth. 
Over the past thirty years, companies such as Corrections Corporation of 
America (CCA) and the Geo Group have been managing, and at times even 
building, a growing number of prisons across the United States; a common plank 
of the standard story of prison growth is that their profit-driven desire for more 
and more prisoners to manage has led them to lobby for tougher and tougher 
sentencing laws, thus contributing in important ways to rising incarceration 
rates. Unfortunately, that standard account suffers from significant defects that 
tend to overstate the importance of private firms and highlight the wrong reason 
why private prisons pose problems—with important consequences for reforming 
private and public prisons alike.
Aviram perhaps makes the more forceful case for the importance of private 
prisons, arguing that their expansion reflects a [“seismic”] shift in U.S. penal 
policy. … Yet the weakness of this claim is apparent … when Aviram admits that 
“as of 2010, private prisons housed ‘128,195 of the 1.6 million state and federal 
prisoners in the United States[.]’” In other words, by the end of this “seismic 
shift” only 8.4% of the prison population was in private prisons in 2014—and 
at the state level, only 6.8%, with over half of those in just five states. Of course, 
private prisons may matter more than the number of prisoners they hold if we 
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think their lobbying makes all sentences tougher (or makes reform harder), thus 
increasing public prison populations as well.
This latter argument is the one that Gottschalk basically makes. She points out, 
correctly, that incarceration was growing well before the private firms appeared, 
so they cannot be blamed for the onset of mass incarceration. But, she argues, 
their lobbying efforts now pose a serious impediment to reform. She argues that 
the private prison companies actually viewed the Great Recession as an oppor-
tunity more than a risk, since they expected that state budget cuts would lead 
to capacity constraints and, eventually, the need for private prisons to mitigate 
the overcrowding. [W]hatever its theoretical potential, [however,] this concern 
appears to have not been realized.
A. Private Prisons and Prison Growth
The first major problem that the private-prisons-as-engines-of-growth story faces 
is that it is … hard to detect any significant effect in the data. [T]here simply are 
not that many prisoners in private prisons. In terms of contribution to overall 
growth, between 1990 and 2008 (the peak year for the number of state prisoners 
in private prisons), the number of private prisoners rose by over 87,500, while 
the total number of state prisoners rose by almost 701,000—so 12.5% of all 
additional prisoners were held in private prisons. 
But that does not mean that privatization accounted for 12.5% of the growth in 
prison populations. Many, if not most, of those who ended up in private prisons 
during those years would have been placed in public prisons had the private  
option not existed, so it is unfair to say that the private prison option caused 
those incarcerations. If private prisons were substantially cheaper to run, one 
could argue that private prisons nonetheless expanded states’ fiscal ability to 
incarcerate, but … there is little to no evidence that private prisons cut costs; if 
anything, they may be more expensive, which would suggest that privatization 
could actually have slowed prison growth by raising costs (although, as noted in 
Part I, the overall impact of incarceration on budgets is sufficiently slight that 
any such effect is likely minor at most). 
More likely, privatization reflected more of an ideological commitment to pri-
vate contracting. …  And it is likely that a political commitment to privatization 
is stronger in more conservative states—which are also likely to be more puni-
tive. Thus even if we were to observe faster growth rates in more-privatized states, 
it would be hard to disentangle the effect of privatization from the ideological 
forces that led to both privatization and rising incarceration in the first place.
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B. Private Prisons, Lobbying, and the Politics of Crime
The numbers in the previous Section may suggest that private prison firms are not 
a major force behind prison growth, but they certainly do not prove that claim. 
So if there is convincing evidence that these firms are effective political actors, 
then we should be concerned that the problem is really with my numbers. The 
basic thrust of [this argument] is that these firms have thrown a lot of money at 
state legislatures, which results [in] tougher sentencing laws in general, which are 
designed to keep inmates in for longer terms in public and private prisons alike. 
[Aviram, like Gottschalk, argues that private prison groups have developed 
powerful lobbying arms, pointing out that CCA alone spent over $2 million 
on lobbying between 2003 and 2012.] Viewed in isolation, Aviram’s numbers 
appear quite large. But their significance declines substantially when placed in 
broader context. Looking beyond just CCA, between 1986 and 2014 private 
prison groups spent slightly more than $13 million lobbying. During that same 
time, the total amount spent on lobbying at the state level by all groups ran to 
over $36 billion. So private lobbying amounted to only 0.03% of all spending 
during that time. A drop in the bucket.
That comparison is, however, a bit unfair. Private prison groups concentrated 
their spending in a handful of states: nearly 40% of all spending occurred just in 
Florida, 12% in California, and about 5 to 6% each in Georgia, New Jersey, and 
Tennessee. But even in those states the overall share of lobbying by private prison 
groups is slight: 0.3% in Florida, 0.03% in California, 0.1% in New Jersey, 0.1% 
in Georgia, and 0.2% in Tennessee. 
That said, I’m still being unfair. Successful lobbying isn’t just a game of who has 
the most dollars. A small amount of spending can go a long way if the opposi-
tion lacks the resources or inclination to push back. But [this] is a complicated 
[issue]. It’s true that until recently there was no group explicitly aligned against 
tough-on-crime positions (a role that smart-on-crime campaigns are now filling). 
But at the same time, state budgetary processes are much more zero-sum than 
at the federal level. [S]tates cannot print money, and they borrow at rates less 
favorable than those faced by the national government; both these facts should 
constrain state spending. Tellingly, at least until the past few years, state spending 
moved in almost perfect lockstep with state revenue, suggesting that states were 
genuinely limited by what they were able to bring in.
As a result of these constraints, we should expect those lobbying for tougher sen-
tencing laws to face opposition not from explicitly soft-on-crime groups, but from 
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everyone else, all of whom are seeking access to a fairly limited pool of money. So 
education and medical lobbies likely push back against efforts to expand punish-
ment in general, and public sector lobbies should resist privatization (even if they 
may favor increased punitiveness more broadly). And many such groups exert far 
more power, at least in dollar terms, than private prison firms. During the time 
when private prison groups spent $13 million on lobbying, educational groups 
spent over $256 million, medical groups over $360 million, and public employ-
ee lobbies over $132 million. Even in Florida, where the private prison groups 
concentrated their lobbying the most, the private prison groups were outspent 
five-to-one by the medical lobbies and two-to-one by the educational lobbies 
(although they did outspend the public employee lobbies by almost 70%).
Yet, despite focusing its spending in Florida, in 2012 the private prison lobby 
suffered a somewhat surprising defeat when the state senate voted down a bill to 
privatize twenty-seven prisons by a vote of twenty-one to twenty (in a chamber 
with only twelve Democratic senators). Privatization would have resulted in 
3,500 state guards losing their jobs, and the [bill’s failure] was seen as an example 
of a public sector union defeating the private prison lobby. And this despite the 
private prison lobbies outspending the public employee ones by 30% that year, 
$430,000 to $330,000 (and, as pointed out above, by 70% over the years 1986 
and 2014).
In fact, it is worth thinking about public sector lobbying a bit more. Never men-
tioned in [any discussions about private prisons] is that plenty of public groups 
[have] a strong incentive to lobby for tougher laws as well, making it hard to 
estimate what is really the variable of interest, namely the marginal contribution 
of private prison lobbying to prison growth. 
There are at least three reasons why public groups will lobby aggressively for 
expanding punishments (or against reducing them). The first is employment: 
prison guard unions, like private prisons, benefit from growing incarceration 
rates. Most notably, the California Correctional and Peace Officer Association 
(CCPOA) has lobbied hard for tougher sentencing laws and is thought to play 
a not unimportant role in California’s punitiveness. And while the CCPOA 
may be the most powerful and effective of such lobbies, other state correctional 
officer associations surely matter as well; just note the success of guard unions in 
Florida in blocking privatization, and the guard union in Tennessee was similarly 
successful in blocking privatization efforts there.
Second, more-rural legislators may fight for more prisoners in the name of jobs 
more generally. Despite evidence to the contrary, many legislators believe that 
60    |     FORDHAM LAW
having prisons in their districts provides meaningful employment and economic 
growth to their constituents, even after the prison is built. Thus they resist efforts 
to close them. New York State, for example, struggled for years to close empty 
prisons in the face of fierce opposition from the districts where those prisons 
were located. And these sorts of political pressures do not require any real lob-
bying expenditures. The legislators themselves are acutely aware of the feared, if 
empirically overstated, employment impact … and they are well-incentivized to 
resist such closures. … 
Third[,] in all but four states, legislators in districts with prisons [see] their pow-
er grow with their prisons. Outside of California (come 2020), Delaware (come 
2020), Maryland (now), and New York (now), for purposes of state districting, 
prisoners count as residents of the areas in which they are incarcerated, not where 
they come from. Since prisoners are disproportionately urban, and prisons are 
disproportionately rural, this policy effectively transfers power from cities to 
rural areas. Rural voters in counties with prisons thus exert undue influence in 
state legislatures. …  
A final problem with both books’ takes on the impact of private prison lobbying 
is that both rely too heavily on the conventionally accepted claim that prison 
growth is driven in large part by inmates serving longer sentences. Were this 
claim generally correct, then successfully lobbying for longer sentences would 
almost mechanistically lead to more prisoners, public and private alike. But my 
work has shown that time served has not actually grown that much, and certain-
ly not enough to explain the magnitude of growth we have witnessed. At least 
since the mid-1990s, it appears that the main engine of prison growth has been a 
rise in admissions, not time served, with the latter remaining fairly flat.
None of this is to say that rising admissions and longer sentences are not related, 
since prosecutors may use those tougher sanctions to extract pleas more effi-
ciently. But these results do mean that the impact of any change in sentencing 
law, whether the product of private or public lobbying, will be mediated by what 
locally elected, relatively independent, county-level prosecutors choose to do. 
And there is at least some evidence that they are willing to ignore tougher laws 
when convenient to do so. Figure 3 plots the number of inmates in New York 
State prisons serving time for drug offenses, and the first vertical line marks 
1972, the year the state adopted its draconian Rockefeller Drug Laws. Strikingly, 
there is almost no change whatsoever in the number of drug inmates following 
the laws’ adoption: tougher laws, no change. Of course, prosecutors do appear to 
take advantage of the laws in the 1980s, though they also stop using them long 
before any of the subsequent reforms weakening the laws are passed (the second 
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and third vertical lines). So the simple more-private-prison-money-leads-to-
longer-sentences story overlooks the surprisingly tricky question of how longer 
sentences necessarily lead to more prisoners [in general].
978 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:951
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Figure 3 Drug Prisoners in New York State Prisons, 1965–201385
Research, Working Paper No. 20283, 2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20283.pdf [http://
perma.cc/PRG5-VEPR].
85. See Pfaff, War on Drugs, supra note 12, at 215–17.
C. The Problem Isn’t Privatization, It’s Contracts
The final major flaw with [most attacks on] the evils of private prisons is that 
they are really looking at the wrong thing. Gottschalk in particular points out 
that the dangers posed by private prisons extend beyond their desire to maximize 
the numb r of beds filled each day: th ir guards are more poorly trained, they  
are less likely to provide rehabilitation programs, inmates are more likely to  
be exposed to violence than in public prisons, etc. And there is evidence that  
tougher prison conditions increase the risk of subsequent recidivism, which  
is perhaps good for private firms’ bottom lines, but bad social policy. The con-
cerns Gottschalk raises are all completely valid. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, none  
of them necessarily argues against private prisons. They just argue in favor of 
better contracts.
To see why, consider the following story. A state pays the wardens of its prisons a 
per-diem rate, and that rate is more than the cost of housing the prisoner (or the 
wardens at least cut costs down to make that the case). The wardens use the ad-
ditional revenue to fund services outside the prison, and they do not focus much 
Figure 3 Drug Pris     i ns, 1965–2013
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on rehabilitation, and in fact fight against early release policies and work hard to 
ensure their prisons are full so their profits are higher. This is, in a nutshell, the 
conventional private firm, profit-motive horror story.
But what I’ve just described is not a private prison system at all. It is the way that 
the state of Louisiana contracts with local public sheriffs to confine state inmates 
in public county facilities. The sheriffs then use the extra savings to buy materi-
al for their deputies, even those working outside the jails. In other words, this 
“private firm problem” can occur entirely within the public sector, because the 
problem has very little to do with privatization, at least not directly. It is all about 
contract incentives.
In other words, private prisons focus on warehousing inmates as cheaply as 
possible because they have negotiated contracts that reward them for doing so. 
Write a contract that pays based on recidivism rates, not occupancy, and private 
prisons will focus more on training and programming and less on capacity. This 
is not an idle thought experiment. Though the idea of incentivizing contracts 
for private prisons has received fairly little academic interest, it is already being 
implemented in the field. Pennsylvania recently imposed recidivism-linked 
incentive contracts on the private firms that operate its halfway houses. If a com-
pany pushes recidivism rates sufficiently far below the historic average, it receives 
a bonus, while if rates drift too high for two years in a row then it loses the con-
tract. Interestingly, the nation’s largest private prison firm, CCA, recently bought 
four of the halfway houses operating under these contracts, suggesting that CCA 
thinks it can successfully manage and improve on parolee recidivism rates.
Obviously, crafting such contracts is easier said than done, so I do not want to be 
seen as just glibly saying “write better contracts.” Designing contracts that prop-
erly align incentives will be tricky, and states should think carefully about what 
goals they want to measure and if recidivism is the only relevant one. But none 
of these undermine the basic point, namely that the ills identified by Aviram and 
Gottschalk, to the extent that they exist, do not reflect the problem of privatiza-
tion per se, but rather of bad publicly written contracts.
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Money has dominated American 
politics since the beginning, 
and reform has often led to 
twists, turns, and unintended 
consequences for our legal system.
Jed Shugerman’s historical research shines new light on 
how independent regulatory agencies, also known as  
the government’s fourth branch, arose from a new 
political dependence on powerful special interests.
His work provides the following insights:
•	 Nineteenth-century political parties were initially financed by patronage 
kickbacks. When those kickbacks were suddenly banned, politicians 
created new institutions—some of the foundations of the modern 
administrative state—to avail themselves of untapped financial resources 
from special interests after the kickback/assessment system fell in the 
1880s.
•	 The Senate’s creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) 
in 1887 has been interpreted as the first “independent agency,” a model 
for some of the most important institutions in modern America, such as 
the Federal Reserve. In context, however, it was a move toward political 
accountability (and control by railroad special interests) rather than 
toward political independence.
•	 The ICC caused a decisive shift from a premodern common-law model 
of enforcement by private plaintiffs to a modern administrative model of 
enforcement by public prosecutors.
•	 The ICC proved a decisive turning point toward the 20th-century’s 
nationwide regulation and campaign finance politics as well as special 
interests focusing on control of the administrative state. 
By challenging conventional wisdom, Shugerman illuminates how a sudden 
shift to our modern system of campaign finance shaped the foundations of 
modern American government. 
Jed Handelsman Shugerman
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The Dependent Origins of 
Independent Agencies: The 
Interstate Commerce Commission, 
the Tenure of Office Act, and the 
Rise of Modern Campaign Finance
31 Journal of Law & Politics 139-186 (2015)
The federal executive branch has a peculiar institutional structure. U.S. Attorneys 
and many other high-ranking law officers are formally accountable to the execu-
tive branch (and most state prosecutors are popularly elected). In other western 
democracies, prosecutors are relatively independent from electoral politics and 
the executive branch’s control. 
But when it comes to economic regulation, these roles are reversed. Some of the 
most important areas of economic and commercial policy in the United States 
are delegated to “independent regulatory agencies” insulated from executive 
or congressional control.1 They are considered so independent that they are 
sometimes called a “fourth branch” of the federal government.2 In many parlia-
mentary systems, economic and commercial policy is sometimes delegated to 
expert commissions with job security, but aside from central banking, most of 
those policies still must be ratified by the cabinet or parliament. 
The exceptional American executive branch was not designed to be so unique. 
Originally, prosecutors had more structures to protect their job security, and 
1  The following agencies and boards are often categorized as “independent”: the Federal Reserve Board (“the 
Fed”), the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”), Board 
of Consumer Financial Protection, Commodity Futures Trading Commissions (“CFTC”), Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), U.S. International Trade Commission, 
Postal Regulatory Commission, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, and the National Credit Union 
Administration. The Federal Election Commission (“FEC”), the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”), 
Social Security Administration (“SSA”), National Transportation Safety Commission, and the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission are also considered independent agencies. Economic regulation is “without a doubt, best exercised 
in an atmosphere of independence, rather than as part and parcel of the process of execution of the laws, exposed to all 
the pressures which play upon the political branches.” The Economic Regulation of Business and Industry: 
A Legislative History of U.S. Regulatory Agencies 7 (Bernard Schwartz, ed., 1973). There is some question 
as to whether the independence of these agencies is due more to formal statutory protection or to political norms. See 
Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 Colum L. Rev. 1163 (2013).
2  See, e.g., Paul Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, Duke L.J. 257 (1988); Jonathan Turley, 
The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, Wash. Post, May 24, 2013 (http://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-ofgovernment/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9ef2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.
html).
EXCERPT
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regulatory agencies were adopted because they would be politically account-
able, not independent. Congress created the Department of Justice while U.S. 
Attorneys could not be fired at will by the President, and the congressional mod-
el for independent agencies was actually a model of political dependence, when 
viewed in context. On the one hand, a series of accidents and unintended con-
sequences shaped this odd balance of independence and accountability. But at 
the same time, a significant transformation in American party politics coincided 
with a key moment of design, and they fundamentally shaped these structures.
Around the time when Congress was debating core institutional arrangements 
in the mid-1880s, the structure of American campaign finance was rapidly 
shifting from a system of officeholder patronage kickbacks to our more recog-
nizable modern system of large special interest campaign contributions. For 
decades, parties had been financed by a patronage machine of salary kickbacks 
and assessments (the coercive solicitation of funds by party officials from public 
employees). Reformers attacked this “spoils system” after the Civil War, and they 
made two major legislative advances: the 1876 Anti-Assessment Act3 and the 
Pendleton Act of 1883,4 which established the first major civil service reforms.5 
The Anti-Assessment Act prohibited assessments for all federal offices, and 
the Supreme Court upheld the statute’s constitutionality in 1882, after party 
bosses had begun to be convicted.6 Historians have concluded from the available 
evidence that, between 1876 and 1883, political assessments “declined precip-
itously.”7 Then the Pendleton Act of 1883 sharply increased the penalties for 
assessments, and its new civil service reforms began to cut back on the spoils sys-
tem. As a result, campaign contributions by individuals and corporate interests 
increasingly filled the new campaign finance vacuum. 
It turns out that these sudden shifts in party politics helped establish the bifur-
cated structure of the modern executive branch, with its “unitary” presidential 
power over most executive offices on the one side, and on the other side, “inde-
pendent agencies” with enormous power and insulation from the President, so 
much so that they are often called a “fourth branch” of the federal government.8 
3  5 U.S.C. § 1180 (1876).
4  22 Stat. 403 (1883).
5  See Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage 209–29 (1905); Kurt Hohenstein, 
Coining Corruption: The Making of the American Campaign Finance System, 1865-1883, at 
13–61 (2007); Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform 
Movement 198–252 (1961); Raymond J. La Raja, Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and 
Campaign Finance Reform 17–26 (2008); George Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree? American 
Campaign Financing Practices from 1789 to the Present 37–51 (1974).
6  Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 375 (1882). 
7  Hohenstein, supra note 4, at 24; see also Hoogenboom, supra note 4, at 226-27.
8  See, e.g., Paul Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L. J. 257, 257; Jonathan 
Turley, “The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government,” Washington Post, May 24, 2013 (http://www.
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By understanding the political background of this era, it becomes clear that the 
“independent agencies” actually had their origins in a new political dependence 
on special interests. This story shows how sudden changes in campaign finance 
triggered dramatic changes in constitutional design and set the foundation for 
the modern executive branch.
This Article focuses on two pivotal events in 1886-1887 that were shaped by 
this transformation in campaign finance and, in turn, fundamentally shaped the 
modern executive branch: the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act (which re-es-
tablished a more “unitary” executive and increased presidential power over most 
federal offices), and the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (the 
“ICC”) in 1887, which began the carving out of independent agencies that even-
tually limited presidential power. This Article does not argue that the changes in 
campaign finance caused the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act, but it sug-
gests that those changes shaped the design of the ICC and shifted more political 
support for a commission, rather than reliance on the courts for enforcement. 
Scholars look back to the ICC as a foundation for modern administrative law 
and the model of the modern independent agency.9 Legal scholars often explain 
that independent agencies are designed to promote expertise and bureaucratic 
autonomy by insulating policymaking from partisanship and political pressure.10 
washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-ofgovernment/2013/05/ 24/   c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-
6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html).
9  See, e.g., Donald L. Carper, John A. McKinsey & Bill W. West, Understanding the Law 207–08 
(5th ed. 2008); Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law 439 (2d ed. 1985) (stating the creation 
of the ICC in 1887 “has been taken as a kind of genesis” of American administrative law); Jerry L. Mashaw, 
Creating The Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Law 
3–5 (2012) (summarizing the scholarly conventional wisdom regarding contemporary administrative law); 1 David 
Schultz, Encyclopedia of the United States Constitution 387 (2009); Bernard Schwartz & 
Erwin Webb, Administrative Law § 1.2 (A. James Casner et al. eds, 2d ed. 1984); Harold Bruff, Presidential 
Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 Yale L.J. 451 (1979); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical 
Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1189 (1986); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, 
The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 605–06 (2005); William H. Hardie III, 
Note, The Independent Agency After Bowsher v. Synar—Alive and Kicking, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 903, 906–07 (1987). 
10  Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 15, 19-20 
(2010) (“The main aim in creating an independent agency is to immunize it, to some extent, from political pressure. 
… Thus, the New Dealers hoped to create apolitical agencies that would be guided by information and not politics.”); 
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2376 (2006) 
(noting that independent agencies “were conceived as means to limit the sphere over which partisan political power 
could exert control”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation 
of Powers, 59 Emory L.J. 423, 429 (2009) (stating that independent agencies are designed to “ensure regularity 
and the rule of law by depoliticizing governmental administration”); Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of 
Independent Agencies, 1988 Duke L.J. 257, 260 (noting that independent agencies are “designed to isolate those 
decisionmakers from politics”); see also Abner Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 123 (1994); Abner Greene, Discounting Accountability, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1489 (1997) (discussing 
the constitutionality of independent agencies); cf. Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: 
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 459, 463 (2008) (“Independent agencies 
are preferred to executive agencies because long commissioner tenure, staggered terms, and political insulation are 
intended to facilitate a non-political environment where regulatory experts can apply their knowledge to complex 
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One basic model for modern American independent agencies is a commission 
or board whose members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate to a term of six years or more, and whom the President may remove only 
for cause, not at will.11 The first federal commission in this mold was the ICC.12 
The Interstate Commerce Act was the first to use the formula of job security that 
would continue into the statutes creating independent agencies in the twentieth 
century: a commissioner may be removed only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
or malfeasance in office.”13 Their staggered six-year terms and bipartisan require-
ments also were a model for twentieth-century independent agencies.14
The existing scholarship generally contends that Congress was “shifting responsi-
bility,” decreasing its own power so that it could punt difficult issues and delegate 
them to a new commission.15 The standard histories of the ICC focus mainly on 
the substantive aspects of the Interstate Commerce Act, but do not pay enough 
attention to the institutions, procedures, and enforcement. Stephen Skowronek 
concluded that Congress wanted to remove “policy decisions from the legislative 
arena. … Indeed, … no one interest predominated except perhaps the legislators’ 
interest in finally getting the conflict of interests off their backs and shifting it 
to a commission and the courts.”16 Morris Fiorina’s trilogy of articles reached 
the same general conclusion, and even labeled Congress’s goal “SR” for “shift the 
responsibility” in his formal model.17 
policy problems.”). 
11  Several commissions that are often described as independent lack statutory protection of removal only for cause, 
and instead rely on extended terms. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012); 47 U.S.C. § 
154(c) (2012) (stating FCC “commissioners shall be appointed for terms of five years”); 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(2)(A) 
(2014) (“Members of the [Federal Election] Commission shall serve for a single term of 6 years.”); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 
(2012) (“Members of the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission shall be appointed by the President by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of five years.”). The terms are fixed and set to have longer terms 
than the President who appointed the commissioners, but the statutes are silent about the conditions of dismissal—
and silence has been interpreted to allow dismissal without cause. See Vermeule, supra note 1, at 1165–81; see also 
William N. Eskridge Jr. et al., Cases and Materials on Legislation and Regulation: Statutes and 
the Creation of Public Policy (5th ed. 2014); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent 
Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 Cornell L. Rev. 769 (2013). 
12  See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 § 11.
13  Id.
14  Id.
15  See Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920, at 145–48 (1982); Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory 
Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 Pub. Choice 33, 46–49 (1982) [hereinafter Fiorina, Process]; 
Morris P. Fiorina, Legislator Uncertainty, Legislative Control, and the Delegation of Legislative Power, 2 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 33, 46-47 (1986) [hereinafter Fiorina, Uncertainty].
16  Skowronek, supra note 15, at 145, 148.
17  Fiorina, Process, supra note 15, at 46-49. Fiorina asked, “What incentives lead legislators to delegate to 
unelected officials not only the administration but even the formulation of public policy?” Morris P. Fiorina, Group 
Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 
175, 176 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985). Positive political theorists have offered an additional observation, but it has not 
been picked up by historians or legal scholars. In one brief passage, Fiorina suggests that the Senate may have had a 
different agenda, but this suggestion has not yet been explored in the historical sources, nor has it crossed over from 
positive political theory into the historical or administrative law scholarship. Fiorina, Uncertainty, supra note 12, at 
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My research points to the opposite interpretations. The Senate was seizing pow-
er, not avoiding it. The President was also increasing his own power as well, in 
stark contrast to the anachronistic notion that the ICC was conceived as an “in-
dependent agency.” First, this Article focuses on the House bill, the Senate bill, 
and the final statute to show how the Senate’s creation of the ICC was actually a 
power grab. The ICC originally was a move away from a far more independent 
enforcement model (private civil litigation in the courts) towards a model of 
shared political accountability (a commission nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate for six-year terms). Baselines and context are crucial for 
understanding this question of independence. In the twenty-first century, the 
baseline is an executive agency under presidential control, and by comparison, 
the ICC model (presidential appointment with Senate confirmation to fixed 
longer terms, and dismissal only for cause) is relatively independent from pres-
idential control. But in the late nineteenth century, the ICC really was a move 
away from enforcement by an independent judiciary to an executive agency 
that was relatively accountable to both the President and the Senate. Moreover, 
Congress gave the Interior Department control over the funding of the ICC and 
its supporting personnel, and it gave the Department of Justice control over liti-
gating the ICC rulings. Once Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act (at the 
same time it created the ICC), both the Interior Department and the DOJ were 
under a more unitary model of presidential power, and placed the ICC more 
closely in the President’s power.
The curiosity here is that Senators were simultaneously surrendering other pow-
ers by repealing the Tenure of Office Act and giving up substantial control over 
federal offices.
This Article suggests that Senators were reacting to the new political campaign 
structure. Senators were elected by state legislatures until the Seventeenth 
Amendment in 1913.18 Senators did not need to raise their own cash for di-
rect public campaigning, but they had an equally pressing need to bring home 
patronage and assessment cash for their state and local party machines. With 
patronage kickbacks suddenly criminalized, Senators had less reason to hold 
onto their control over officers, and a reason to find new sources of funding 
to keep their state legislatures satisfied. When a political controversy over the 
Tenure of Office Act struck in 1886, the law was newly vulnerable, and Senators 
46–47. See also Thomas W. Gilligan, William J. Marshall & Barry R. Weingast, Regulation and the Theory of Legislative 
Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 32 J.L. & Econ. 35, 47–48 (1989) (taking Fiorina’s observation as an 
invitation, and also linking this observation to the historical literature on the development of the administrative state 
and independent agencies).
18  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 1–2.
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abandoned it more readily. Special interest money—including railroad money—
was becoming more important to political war chests, and Senators created an 
institution that would make the Senate long-term power brokers. In the bigger 
picture, Senators were increasing their overall power by playing a role in selecting 
and retaining the members of the ICC. Recent scholars have observed that the 
interests at the time—the populist reformers and the railroad executives—could 
not tell if the Interstate Commerce Act was a win or loss.19 The provisions of 
the Act were full of compromises, and they were open-ended. This Article 
suggests that the procedures created by the Act were more important than the 
indeterminate substance, and that this indeterminacy made the President and 
Senate the joint winners. Their nominations and confirmations would swing 
the ICC one way or the other, and thus, the competing interests would have to 
spend to make sure the President and Senate would appoint their supporters 
to the Commission. On the House floor, Congressman Bragg, a critic of the 
Commission, connected these dots: 
 
[I]f Congress votes for the appointment of persons who are 
to determine ultimately upon the construction of the law it 
passes, we force railroad capital into the canvass to secure the 
election of a man who will bend his knee to their wishes in 
order to secure their support. Therefore I regard it as a danger-
ous exercise of power, and one which … will ultimately hang a 
millstone around their necks by which they will be drowned in 
the deep sea.20
Part I explains the fall of the kickback/assessment system of party campaign 
finance and the resulting rise of modern campaign finance by special interests. 
Part II tells the story of the Tenure of Office Act’s passage, revision, and sudden 
repeal, which establishes some important background for the ICC. In January 
1887, Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act, which meant that the Senate 
abandoned its power to block the President from removing “principal” execu-
tive officers, giving the President the unilateral power to dismiss Department 
of Justice principal officers for the first time. The repeal of the Tenure of Office 
Act meant that the President had more direct control over the new ICC, and 
executive officers who influenced the ICC and enforced its rulings had less job 
security. Part III turns to the ICC’s creation. When the Senate surrendered its 
power over appointees by repealing the Tenure of Office Act, and simultaneous-
ly pushed for the ICC, it signaled a transition away from nineteenth-century 
19  See, e.g., Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern 
America 356 (2011).
20  18 Cong. Rec. 842 (1887).
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campaign finance by patronage and towards twentieth-century campaign finance 
from industry and special interests. The conclusion offers some thoughts about 
the shift from private to public enforcement, from the local to the national, the 
history of campaign finance, the growth of presidential power, and the surprising 
origins of independent agencies.
I. From Patronage to Special Interests
Patronage financed the mid-nineteenth century party system. Corporations and 
special interests financed the twentieth century party system. The turning point 
was the 1880s,21 and this transformation was the political background as the 
administrative state emerged. One scholar observed that the campaign finance 
system underwent its two most significant changes in the 1880s and 1890s, and 
then in the post-Watergate Era of the mid-1970s.22
One leading historian observed that party coalitions “were held together only 
by the cohesive power of public plunder.”23 Elected officials benefited from 
party machines, and to reward their supporters, those politicians appointed 
them to well-paying government offices. Parties then required those appointees 
(and the elected leaders) to pay a significant percentage of money—an “assess-
ment”—back to the party. The assessment system was a key mechanism of the 
spoils system, and it “became the most important financial source for campaign 
contributions.”24 One assessment form letter from Pennsylvania demanded, 
“Two percent of your salary is ___. Please remit promptly. At the close of the 
campaign we shall place a list of those who have not paid in the hands of the 
head of the department you are in.”25 Philadelphia officials who earned over 
$10,000 a year had to pay 12 percent. In Louisiana, government officials paid 
a flat 10 percent. Once an official paid off his local, state, and federal party 
assessments, he was usually paying far more than 10 percent in total.26 The years 
after the Civil War ushered in an era of rapid growth for the federal government. 
The number of federal employees skyrocketed in the Civil War years and during 
Reconstruction, and then that number doubled from 51,000 employees in 
1871 to 100,000 in 1881.27 Systematic assessments from the growing number of 
21  Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 48.
22  Id.
23  Id. at 15.
24  Id. at 19; see also Hoogenboom, supra note 5, at 2–5; Robert Maranto & David Schultz, A Short 
History of the United States Civil Service 58–59 (1991); E.L. Godkin, The Democrats and Civil Service 
Reform, The Nation, Dec. 2, 1880, at 388.
25  Thayer, supra note 5, at 38.
26  Id.
27  Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 14; Morton Keller, Affairs of State: Public Life in Late 
Nineteenth Century America 239 (1977).
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federal officeholders “provided the main and steadiest source of campaign con-
tributions.”28 Assessments were becoming an increasingly lucrative way to finance 
both parties in the 1860s and 1870s, because even if Republicans controlled the 
executive branch, Senators and Congressmen wielded enormous control over 
appointments and patronage. 
But at the same time, the growth of government employment also exposed the 
assessment system to new scrutiny as a source of waste and corruption. A wing of 
the Republican Party, the “liberal” reformist wing, was outraged by corruption 
scandals during the Grant administration and turned against patronage. The 
reformers began their attack on assessments immediately after the Civil War. 
Congress passed the Naval Appropriations Act, which required the dismissal of 
any officer who requested political payments from Navy Yard employees.29 Then, 
in 1876, they steered the Anti-Assessment Act through Congress, part of a “sea 
change in the manner in which political parties would raise and spend campaign 
funds.”30 Congress was primarily focused on cutting the budget in 1876, and 
one source of cuts was the reduction of federal salaries. Congressmen knew that 
federal officers had been paying assessments from their salaries, so their solution 
would leave officers with the same take-home pay: reduce salaries by 10 percent, 
and also eliminate assessments (by criminalizing the requests) so that employees 
could take home the same pay, while saving the taxpayers the money that would 
have gone to the party machines.31 The result was the bipartisan Anti-Assessment 
Act, and it passed the House by such a large margin that only a voice vote was 
necessary.32
…
The Anti-Assessment Act and the decision in Ex Parte Curtis together “sev-
ered political parties from their most lucrative source of campaign funds.”33 
Historians have concluded from the available evidence that between 1876 and 
1883, political assessments “declined precipitously.”34 The key development in 
1883 was the passage of the Pendleton Act, which strengthened the prohibitions 
on political assessments.35 In the congressional debates, the members of Congress 
declared that the assessment provisions were the most important part of the 
28  Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 15.
29  Id. at 16.
30  Id. at 13–14.
31  Id. at 21.
32  Id.; James K. Pollock, Jr., Party Campaign Funds 7 (1926).
33  Id.
34  Id.; see also Hoogenboom, supra note 5, at 226-27.
35  Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 25, 27. See also Regulation and Improvement of Civil Service, S. Rep. 
No. 46-872 (3d Sess. 1881); Hoogenboom, supra note 5, at 234; Keller, supra note 24 at 243; Ari Hoogenboom, 
The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service, 64 Am. Hist. Rev. 301, 303 (1959); Reform Cheap for Cash, N.Y. Times, June 
9, 1876, at 4.
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bill.36 Thereafter, assessments again dropped sharply. “The post-Pendleton wean-
ing of the parties from assessment-sourced funding, coupled with the growth 
and rising influence of national corporations within the political system, by 
1896 reshaped the structure of campaign financing that would remain essentially 
unchanged until 1971.”37 
These events “caused both political leaders and American businessmen to reex-
amine their role in national campaign finance issues.”38 Just as the funds from 
assessments were drying up, the costs of elections were dramatically increasing 
in the 1880s and 1890s. Corporate spending more than replaced the assess-
ments—it created the modern campaign finance system.39 The prohibitions on 
assessments coincided with the sharp growth of corporate power, so businesses 
were well positioned to step in and take over party politics. Both Democrats 
and Republicans relied more and more heavily on corporate spending, and they 
found new ways to extract donations from targeted businesses. One technique 
was the “squeeze bill” or “frying the fat,” named for holding corporations’ feet to 
the fire and frying the fat out of them with threats of hostile legislation.40 Party 
bosses in the 1880s made quid-pro-quo deals to drop the legislation after the 
targeted corporations paid up.41 
In a recent history of campaign finance, Robert Mutch identified the years 
from 1884 to 1910 as a transitional period. The 1884 election was ruled by 
the “corporate capitalist system that was still taking shape.”42 Crony patronage 
had morphed into crony capitalism. In the 1884 election, James Blaine, the 
Republican nominee, had doubled down on the party’s business support from 
major mercantile elites, Wall Street bankers, and the railroad “robber barons” 
such as Jay Gould. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle warned, “Blaine might be elected 
but Jay Gould would be president.”43 The New York Times called Blaine “the tool 
of Jay Gould.”44 The Democratic Party had become a “second business party” 
under Grover Cleveland, following the model of the Republicans.45 His roster 
36  Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 29-30.
37  Id. at 48.
38  Id. at 14; see also Hoogenboom, supra note 5, at 195–97; Robert D. Marcus, Grand Old Party: 
Political Structure in the Gilded Age, 1880-1896, at 59–100 (1971); Mark Wahlgren Summers, The 
Era of Good Stealings (1993); Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service 85, 
110–11 (1958); Dean McSweeney, Parties, Corruption, and Campaign Finance in America, in Party Finance and 
Political Corruption 37, 37–60 (Robert G. Williams, ed., 2000).
39  Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 31.
40  Thayer, supra note 5, at 46–47.
41  Id., at 48.
42  Robert E. Mutch, Buying the Vote: A History of Campaign Finance Reform 6 (2014).
43  Id. at 13.
44  Id.
45  Id. at 6. 
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of business supporters was not quite up to Blaine’s level, but he was able to line 
up his own Gilded Age railroad and manufacturing barons.46 Grover Cleveland 
had been a strong advocate for civil service reform, and at the same time, he led 
the Democratic Party to compete with the Republicans for business support.47 
The 1888 campaign was even more of the same.48 Republicans had the edge in 
corporate spending, but the Democrats were catching up.49 
The 1896 election was peak corporate involvement, an election that stands out as 
the most expensive election in American history (and by far the most as a matter 
of per capita spending or as a percentage of GDP).50 Political financier Mark 
Hanna raised $3.5 million for McKinley, and McKinley’s total was almost $7 
million, compared to just a few hundred thousand dollars for Bryan.51 Ever since 
those elections of the 1880s and 1890s, large donations from special interests 
have been the foundation of the American campaign finance system. That trans-
formation in party politics shaped major decisions about power in the executive 
branch: with the decline of the assessment and spoils politics, the Tenure of 
Office Act was less valuable. Meanwhile, politicians could increase their political 
control over economic policy and accordingly, these politicians could attract 
more corporate contributions to influence policy in one direction or another. 
A commission of specialists—nominated by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate to six-year terms—was a more accountable entity than the judiciary, 
and the powerful railroads would need to find ways of influencing those who 
appointed a new commission regulating railroads.
II. The Repeal of the Tenure of Office Act
Some scholars who endorse the unitary executive theory have treated the Tenure 
of Office Act as a historical aberration and have suggested that its repeal was 
confirmation of a coherent theory of presidential power. This Article offers a new 
interpretation by focusing on the change in campaign finance politics and on the 
personalities and factional politics driving the repeal and a strange Senate acqui-
escence. There are a few reasons why the Senate surrendered a significant amount 
of political power with no obvious return, but one bottom line is that Congress 
had recently prohibited assessments, the Senators derived far less of a political 
46  Id. at 14.
47  Id. at 12–13.
48  Id. at 15–16.
49  Thayer, supra note 5, at 39–40.
50  Matt O’Brien, The Most Expensive Election Ever…1896?, The Atlantic (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.
com/business/archive/2012/11/the-most-expensive-election-ever-1896/264649/ (adjusted dollars, based on percent 
of GDP and/or per capita spending).
51  Hohenstein, supra note 5, at 60.
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or financial benefit from controlling federal offices. As other events weakened 
the Tenure of Office Act, Senators had less of a self-interested reason to fight to 
preserve it. Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act at the same time it passed 
the Interstate Commerce Act. The changes in campaign finance shaped both 
events, but they are not directly related. Nevertheless, the repeal of the Tenure of 
Office Act was significant for interpreting the ICC’s creation. It meant that the 
ICC would be controlled by a more unitary executive, and by executive officials 
(U.S. Attorneys and the DOJ, as well as Interior Department principal officers) 
with less independence and less job security.
…
The result was that the modern President wielded even stronger authority 
over most of the Executive branch, by being able to fire most officers at will. 
Independent agencies represent an exception to this power over the last few 
decades, and that model began with the Interstate Commerce Act.
III. The Interstate Commerce Act
A. The Creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission
The repeal of the Tenure of Office Act set up the context of a shifting debate over 
Senatorial power in the ICC’s creation. Senators had abandoned some of their 
power over federal offices in general, but then they shifted their focus to winning 
more power over regulation by having control over the personnel on the ICC, 
rather than handing the interpretation of a statute over to an independent judi-
ciary. The major railroads had more influence over the Senate, and the Senators 
would reap more of those political and financial benefits by increasing their 
influence over rail commerce over the long haul.
Farmers, merchants, and other shippers denounced the railroads’ predatory 
pricing and demanded regulation. They complained that the railroads charged a 
higher rate for short hauls than for long hauls, which they alleged was price dis-
crimination, but which railroads defended as economies of scale. States began to 
regulate railway rates and to create commissions.52 The Granger movement rep-
resenting agrarian interests called for federal legislation to prohibit price fixing, 
price “discrimination,” pooling, and monopolistic practices.53 Between 1868 and 
1886, more than 150 bills were introduced in Congress for some sort of federal 
regulation of railroads, but they died, until the Supreme Court decided Wabash 
52  See 2 American Landmark Legislation: The Interstate Commerce Act (Irving J. Sloan ed., 1976) 
[hereinafter Landmark Legislation].
53  See generally Elizabeth Saunders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the American State, 
1877-1917 (1999).
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in 1886, limiting state power on railway regulation under the dormant com-
merce clause doctrine.54 The elimination of much state-level regulation sparked 
a broader movement for federal legislation.55 Joining the calls from the West and 
South, from merchants and producers, the railroad companies recognized ad-
vantages in national solutions, in uniformity, reliability, and centralization—but 
only if they thought they could wield power over those new centralized powers. 
Railroads supported a commission they thought they could control. In the end, 
the Senate produced a commission that reflected more Senate control and more 
presidential control, though the commission was still quite vulnerable to the 
railroads, as well.
This Article suggests additionally that the creation of the commission itself reflect-
ed a move towards the railroads’ interests, towards political control, and towards 
the reshaping of the Senate’s power.56 To this end, this Article focuses more closely 
on the institutional design of the commission. The Democratic House, favoring 
more agrarian interests against the railroads, repeatedly passed the Reagan Bill, 
named for John Reagan, the Texas Democrat who had been fighting against rail-
road power for over a decade. Reagan had strong support in the South and West, 
but strong opposition from the Northeast and the railroad industry.57 Meanwhile, 
merchants and consumers joined the call for some kind of federal solution after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wabash. The Reagan Bill focused primarily on 
the standard set of substantive limitations on railway rates.58 It required railways to 
charge reasonable rates, it prohibited rate discrimination, pooling, differentiation 
between short hauls and long hauls, and it required companies to publish sched-
ules and rates.59 But its provisions for enforcement should not be overlooked: the 
bill stated explicitly that these provisions would be enforced by private plaintiffs 
who had been damaged by violations, and who could choose to sue in state or feder-
al court.60 Private plaintiffs could turn to U.S. Commissioners (a kind of marshal) 
54  Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). 
55  Robert E. Cushman, Independent Regulatory Commissions 40–41 (1941); Lawrence Friedman, 
A History of American Law 394 (2d ed. 1973); Skowronek 147–51. 
56  Fiorina offered a suggestion about the Senate: “If the power of confirmation is significant, and I think it is, then 
other things equal, senators should be more confident of their future capacity to influence the administrative process 
and therefore should provide greater support for delegation than congressmen.” Fiorina, supra note 12, at 33, 46–47 
(1986). See also Gilligan et al., supra note 17, at 47–48 (citing Fiorina for the proposition that “[a] commission was 
valuable to senators because the Senate confirms appointees to the commission and therefore could bias appointees in 
the railroads’ favor.”) Historians, administrative law scholars, and American Political Development (“ADP”) scholars 
have not picked up on the suggestion that the Senate had an opposite impulse: adopting a commission would keep the 
Senate in the game through the confirmation and reconfirmation process.
57  17 Cong. Rec. 7751–56 (1886). For party and geographical analysis see To Pass S.1532, An Act to Regulate 
Interstate Commerce, Govtrack.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/49-1/h193 (last visited July 15, 
2015). See also A Biographical Congressional Directory: 1774 to 1903 (1903).
58  H.R. 6657, 49th Cong. (1886) (Reagan bill).
59  Id.
60  Id. 
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for help with subpoenas and finding witnesses, but it included no provisions for 
public prosecution or government litigation. Reagan strongly opposed any propos-
als for commissions.61 Instead, his bills “called for direct recourse to the courts.”62 
Reagan explained on the House floor: “The bill which we report to the House 
… is based upon the theory of furnishing civil remedies in the courts of ordinary 
jurisdiction to parties for the most conspicuous grievances complained of in rail-
road management.”63 Reagan’s committee explained that it would be preferable to 
enforce regulations “through the instrumentality of the ordinary courts of justice … 
than by the orders of a commission.”64
…
On the House floor, Reagan explained why he trusted federal courts and not 
commissioners, though this is surprising from a populist: federal judges had broad 
jurisdiction, and there were many more of them, whereas five commissioners would 
specialize in railroad regulation.65 It would be far easier for the railroads to con-
centrate their resources on capturing a small, specialized commission, rather than 
the diffuse generalist courts.66 The commission’s specialization would effectively 
paint a target on it for the railroads to exert their political pressure. There were 
too many judges with too diffuse a docket to justify the railroads spending heavily 
to influence judicial nominations. But the railroads would surely concentrate on 
controlling the five seats on a railroad commission.67
There is no smoking gun connecting the supporters of the commission to an agen-
da to extract railroad campaign contributions. But there is something of a bloody 
knife: the opponents of the commission made this link …
There was one other significant way in which the ICA reflected more account-
ability within the executive branch. Cullom placed the ICC within the Interior 
Department, and had the Secretary of the Interior pay the salaries and expenses.68 
The final bill gave even more authority to the Secretary of the Interior over budget, 
61  Kolko, supra note 133, at 43; Skowronek, supra note 13, at 144.
62  Skowronek, supra note 13, at 144.
63  H. R. Rep. No. 49-902, at 1 (1886).
64  Id. at 1, 3.
65  Id.
66  Id. (“[If ] we trust the President to appoint our judges, [then] why not to appoint railroad commissioners? The 
answer to this is that judges are not selected to deal with one single great interest, but for the general administration 
of the law, embracing all questions for judicial determination under the Constitution, treaties and law of the United 
States; while these commissioners are to deal with questions which relate to the duties of common carriers alone, but 
questions of daily occurrence, and interests involving billions of dollars, concentrated in a few persons, some of whom 
have proven themselves utterly unscrupulous.”).
67  Moreover, even if many federal judges were pro-railroad, plaintiffs—the farmers, producers, and shippers—
could “forum shop” among the federal trial courts, taking advantage of the diffusion of trial judges to pick a more 
sympathetic judge.
68  Id. at § 15.
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employees, and salaries.69 Between the President’s authority over the Interior 
and the Department of Justice, the ICC would be constrained by the political 
branches, not independent from them. At the same time, some defenders of the 
Reagan bill and private enforcement warned that the Cullom commission-public 
enforcement model was far too vulnerable to capture by the railroads and con-
trol by the President.70 One Congressman warned, “But it seems to me that it is 
utterly indefensible legislation, upon whatever theory of this bill you proceed, to 
create commissioners with the power [over cities and railroads] with an exposure 
to temptation in the way of corruption which would not stand at millions and 
hundreds of millions of dollars.”71
…
The point is that the Senate was focused on defining its own role and its own 
power over executive power in this precise moment. The Senate as an institution 
abandoned one kind of power—the power to block removals—that was outdated 
and out of sync with the new prohibitions on assessments and with a new era of 
campaign finance. Having lost some patronage power, the Senate found access to 
special interests and their cash. The Senators relied on a traditional power, the con-
firmation process (and of course, re-confirmation process when terms were running 
out), to expand their authority in a new frontier: economic regulation.
Conclusion: Histories of Presidential Power and the Modern 
Administrative State
Money matters. The history of campaign finance shaped American government in 
fundamental ways. When the parties relied on assessments on officeholders’ sala-
ries, politicians fought over control over those offices, and protected their shared 
power over the executive branch. When that funding was banned, politicians lost 
interest in most middling offices, but created new institutions to tap into new fi-
nancial resources: special interests, in the form of mammoth railroad corporations. 
They created a new model for executive power—not in terms of independence, 
but precisely a model of political influence in the context of the late nineteenth 
century and the alternative of judicial power. A congressman critical of the ICC 
argued that Congress as “forc[ing] railroad capita” into the appointment process, 
and would be “hang[ing] a millstone around the [commissioners’] necks.”72 Today’s 
independent agencies have their roots in nineteenth-century political accountabili-
ty and the emerging power of special interests.
69  An Act to Regulate Commerce (ICA), ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, 386 (1887).
70  Cong. Rec., 47th Cong., 1st Sess. (1882), appendix 141.
71  18 Cong. Rec. 639, 49th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1887). 
72  18 Cong. Rec. 842 (1887).
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To recap, there were three main reasons why Congress’s creation of the ICC 
was a move towards political accountability more than a move towards political 
independence. First, the Senate bill’s commission model must be contrasted with 
the alternative, the House bill’s judicial enforcement model, rather than with the 
anachronistic twentieth-century executive branch model. Even if commissioners 
served staggered six-year terms with more job security than executive appointees, 
they were still more politically accountable than Article III judges. Even if regula-
tory enforcement ended in court, Congress delegated rule-making and interpretive 
process to the commissioners, not the judges. Second, the enforcement mechanism 
was much more accountable. The House bill’s model relied on private plaintiffs 
bringing civil suits based on statutory claims. Congress instead adopted the Senate 
bill’s reliance on the Department of Justice for enforcement. Third, Congress also 
assigned the power over the ICC’s budget and staffing to the Interior Department. 
As a result, the ICC depended heavily on executive power and the administration’s 
political support. And given how Congress had just repealed the Tenure of Office 
Act, those executive officials had less job security and were suddenly more account-
able to presidential administration than they had been before.
…
Let’s consider the long-term effect of these two bills together, the repeal of the 
Tenure of Office Act and the Interstate Commerce Act. If the Senate had contin-
ued to protect the Tenure of Office Act in the late nineteenth century, it might 
have entrenched its power into the Progressive Era. When the Supreme Court 
turned its attention to similar provisions covering postmasters in Myers v. United 
States in 1926, those provisions would not have been outliers; they would have 
been a long-standing norm since the passage of the original Tenure of Office Act 
in 1867. It is not inevitable that the Supreme Court would have overturned long-
term, widespread practices. Moreover, the Senate could have adapted such power 
for a new age of professionalization and increasing job security for experts. Framed 
in this way (rather than being badly framed by Senator Edmunds and Duskin in 
1886), the Tenure of Office Act may have been viewed as more legitimate and use-
ful. The point is that an alternative structure of the administrative state was more 
than just imaginable, and modern administrative state might have followed a more 
inter-branch path with much more Senate oversight over enforcement  
and regulation.
Here are two key points: First, despite the claims of historians and American politi-
cal development scholars, the independent agency did not begin with the ICC in 
1887. Bureaucratic autonomy and professional independence did not emerge fully 
formed, and in fact, the Senate and the President were not committed to autonomy 
and independence. The House version of independence was private and decentral-
ized. The ICC’s creation was only possible because the Senate, the President, and 
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the railroads were confident that they could shape and control this new institution. 
But at the same time, they were also deeply committed to this new institution 
having expertise and legitimacy. Only over time, as the ICC earned more trust were 
the political branches assured that they could grant the ICC more independence. 
The political branches also realized that the ICC needed more power, and they 
were willing to trust the ICC with that increased power. The story of the Federal 
Reserve and other independent agencies of the “Fourth Branch” of Government 
follows a similar evolutionary path from accountability toward independence.
Second, independence is a relative concept, and the ICC’s “independence” is a 
function of which baseline one assumes. The Democratic House bills had relied on 
a private enforcement model in federal and state courts.73 It would have been hard 
to construct a more independent model of regulation in the nineteenth century 
than a system of enforcement by private plaintiffs before life-tenured judges. The 
state courts were not independent from politics, because most state judges were 
elected to short terms, but they were obviously independent from the federal gov-
ernment, and many state judges had become more populist and anti-railroad.74 The 
significance of the ICC is that expectations changed dramatically over time. The 
Senate intended to create an accountable agency at a time when judicial power was 
the alternative, and at a time when a commission gave them more access to special 
interest money.
They also created a decisive shift from a pre-modern common law model of 
enforcement by private plaintiffs to a modern administrative model of enforce-
ment by public prosecutors, and a shift from local private contracting parties as 
merchants and producers to national public interests of consumers and national 
economic growth. Instead of being a model of independence, the ICC intro-
duced more political accountability and more influence by corporate interests. 
This moment was a decisive turning point away from the early party system, away 
from local patronage politics, and towards the twentieth century’s nationwide 
regulation, nationwide campaign finance politics, and special interests focusing on 
control of the administrative state. This story shows how sudden shifts in campaign 
finance changed the structure of American government and laid the foundation  
for our peculiar executive branch.
73  H.R. 6657, 49th Cong. § 7 (1886) (Reagan bill).
74  Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion has Influenced the Supreme 
Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution (2009); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The 
People’s Courts: Pursuing Judicial Independence in America 144–58 (2012).
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BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“New Knowledge in Child Protection: Neuroscience and its Impact on Practice” in 
Beyond the Risk Paradigm: Current Debates and New Directions in Child Protection 
(Marie Connolly, ed., New York: Palgrave, 2016).
“Affective Family Law” in The Emotional Dynamics of Law and Legal Discourse 
( John Stannard & Heather Conway, eds., Oxford: Hart, 2017) (forthcoming).
TONI JAEGER-FINE
Assistant Dean for International and Non-JD Programs 
BA, S.U.N.Y. Binghamton, 1983; JD, Duke, 1986
BOOKS:
American Legal Systems: A Resource and Reference Guide, 2d ed. New Providence, 
NJ: LexisNexis, 2015.
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BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Essay” in Constitucionalismo Multinacional (Guilherme Pena de Moraes, Sao Paulo, 
Brazil: Atlas, 2015).
NICHOLAS JOHNSON
Professor of Law 
BSBA, West Virginia University, 1981; JD, Harvard Law School, 1984
BOOKS:
2015-16 Supplement to Firearms Law and the Second Amendment. New York, 
Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2015 [with David B. Kopel, George A. Mocsary & 
Michael P. O’Shea].
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Two Profoundly Different Systems, Cultures and Problems: A Critique of Grif 
Peterson and Tom Preston’s Tale of Two Nations: Comparing Gun Control in the 
US and the UK,” Public Philosophy Journal, available at: http://ppj.matrix.msu.edu/
responses-to-a-tale-of-two-nations/johnson/.
Review of This Nonviolent Stuff ’ll Get You Killed: How Guns Made the Civil Rights 
Movement Possible by Charles Cobb. The Historian  (2015).
“Heller as Miller? Lower Court Defiance of D.C. v. Heller” in Guns and 
Contemporary Society (Glenn H. Utter, ed., Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015).
CONSTANTINE N.  KATSORIS
Wilkinson Professor of Law 
BS, Fordham University, 1953; JD, Fordham Law School, 1957; LLM, New York 
University, 1963
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Tribute to Hon. Joseph M. McLaughlin,” 83 Fordham Law Review 1717-1722 
(2015).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS: 
“The Theft of Social Security?” The Hill (Washington, DC), April 30, 2015,  
available at http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/ 
240546-the-theft-of-social-security.
ANDREW KENT
Professor of Law 
AB, Harvard College, 1993; JD, Yale Law School, 1999
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Citizenship and Protection” (Symposium: Citizenship, Immigration, and National 
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Security After 9/11), 82 Fordham Law Review 2115-2135 (2014).
“Disappearing Legal Black Holes and Converging Domains: Changing Individual 
Rights Protection in National Security and Foreign Affairs,” 115 Columbia Law 
Review 1029-1084 (2015).
JOSEPH LANDAU
Associate Professor of Law 
BA, Duke University, 1995; JD, Yale Law School, 2002
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered,” 47 University of 
Connecticut Law Review 879-936 (2015).
“Roberts, Kennedy, and the Subtle Differences that Matter in Obergefell,” 84 
Fordham Law Review 33-40 (2015).
“Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and Immigration Law,” 65 Duke 
Law Journal 1173-1240 (2016).
THOMAS H.  LEE 
Leitner Family Professor of Law and Director, Graduate and International Studies 
AB, 1991; AM, 1991; JD, 2000; PhD candidate (Political Science), Harvard 
University
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Double Remedies in Double Courts,” 26 European Journal of International Law 
519-34 (2015) [with Sungjoon Cho].
YOUNGJAE LEE 
Professor of Law  
BA, Swarthmore College, 1995; JD magna cum laude, Harvard University, 1999
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
Review of Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique by Hyman Gross. 12 
Journal of Moral Philosophy 103-107 (2015).
“What Is Philosophy of Criminal Law?”  Review of The Oxford Handbook of 
Philosophy of Criminal Law by John Deigh & David Dolinko, eds. 8 Criminal Law 
and Philosophy 671-685 (2014).
ETHAN J.  LEIB
Professor of Law 
BA, Yale University, 1997; MPhil, University of Cambridge, 1998; JD, Yale Law 
School, 2003; PhD, Yale University, 2004
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JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Regleprudence—at OIRA and Beyond,” 103 Georgetown Law Journal 259-315 
(2015) [with Nestor M. Davidson].
“Local Judges & Local Government,” 18 New York University Journal of Legislation 
& Public Policy 707-39 (2015).
“Contra Proferentem and the Role of the Jury in Contract Interpretation,” 87 Temple 
Law Review 773-91 (2015) [with Steve Thel].
“Hail Marriage and Farewell,” 84 Fordham Law Review 41-52 (2015).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships” in The Philosophical Foundations of 
Fiduciary Law (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller, eds., New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014) [with David L. Ponet & Michael Serota].
“Is Omri Ben-Shahar a Duncan Kennedy in Disguise?” (Symposium on Ben-Shahar 
& Schneider), ContractsProfBlog, Sept. 17, 2014, available at http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/contractsprof_blog/2014/09/ben-shahar-schneider-symposium-part-
v-ethan-leib.html.
“Force Majeure,” Tikkun, March 24, 2015, available at http://www.tikkun.org/
tikkundaily/2015/03/24/questions-of-masculinity-in-force-majeure/.
“‘Marriage for all?’ How about marriage for none?” Los Angeles Times Op-Ed 
Section, June 17, 2015, at A23.
ROBIN A.  LENHARDT
Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Center on Race, Law & Justice 
AB, Brown University, 1989; MPA, Harvard University, JFK School of 
Government, 1995; JD, Harvard University, 1995; LLM, Georgetown University 
Law Center, 2004
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Marriage as Black Citizenship?” 66 Hastings Law Journal 1317-1364 (2015).
“Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry,” 84 Fordham Law Review 53-67 (2015). 
MICHAEL M.  MARTIN
Distinguished Professor of Law 
BA with High Distinction with honors, University of Iowa, 1963; JD, University of 
Iowa College of Law, 1966; BLitt (Law), Oxford University, 1968; MLitt, Oxford 
University, 1979
BOOKS:
December 2014 Cumulative Supplement to the Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 
10th ed. San Francisco, CA: LexisNexis, 2014 [with Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel 
J. Capra].
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June 2015 Cumulative Supplement to the Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 10th 
ed. San Francisco, CA: LexisNexis, 2015 [with Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. 
Capra].
2014 Cumulative Supplement: New York Evidence Handbook, 2d ed. New York: 
Aspen Law & Business, 2014 [with Daniel J. Capra & Faust F. Rossi].
CHI ADANNA MGBAKO
Clinical Associate Professor of Law and Director, Leitner International Human Rights 
Clinic 
BA magna cum laude, Columbia University, 2001; JD, Harvard University, 2005
BOOKS:
To Live Freely in This World: Sex Worker Activism in Africa. New York: New York 
University Press, 2016.
CARL MINZNER 
Professor of Law  
BA, Stanford University, 1994; MIA, Columbia University, 2000; JD, Columbia 
Law School, 2000
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Rise of the Chinese Security State,” 222 China Quarterly 339-359 (2015) [with 
Wang Yuhua].
“China after the Reform Era,” 26 Journal of Democracy 129-143 (2015).
“Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era,” 20 Asia Policy 4-9 (2015).
“中国法学教育的潮起潮落 [The Rise and Fall of Chinese Legal Education],” 13 
法律与社会科学 [Law and Social Sciences] (2014).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Laying Down the Law at the Communist Party Plenum,” East Asia Forum, 
September 1, 2014, available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/09/01/
laying-down-the-law-at-the-communist-party-plenum.
“How China’s Leaders Will Rule on the Law,” ChinaFile, October 15, 2014, 
available at: http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/
how-chinas-leaders-will-rule-law.
“After the Fourth Plenum: What Direction for Law in China?” 14(22) Jamestown 
Foundation China Brief 7-10, November 20, 2014, available at: http://www.james-
town.org/uploads/media/China_Brief_Vol_14_Issue_22_3_01.pdf.
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NISHA MISTRY
Director, Fordham Urban Law Center 
BA, Barnard College, 2002; JD, Northeastern University, 2007; MSc with  
distinction, London School of Economics, 2009
BOOKS:
Law between Buildings: Emergent Global Perspectives in Urban Law. Farnham, 
UK: Ashgate, 2016 (forthcoming) [edited with Nestor M. Davidson].
JACQUELINE NOLAN-HALEY 
Professor of Law  
AB, Emmanuel College, 1971; JD cum laude, Suffolk University Law School, 1975; 
LLM, New York University School of Law, 1981
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Mediation: The Best and Worst of Times,” 16 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 
731-739 (2015). 
“Mediation and Access to Justice in Africa: Perspectives from Ghana,” 21 Harvard 
Negotiation Law Review 59-106 (2015).
KIMANI PAUL-EMILE
Associate Professor of Law 
BA with honors, Brown University; JD, Georgetown University Law Center; PhD, 
New York University
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Foreword: Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods,” 83 Fordham Law Review 
2953-2960 (2015).
“Reconsidering Criminal Background Checks: Race, Gender, and Redemption,” 25 
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 395-413 (2016).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Reconsidering Criminal Background Checks, Race, and Redemption” in 
Challenging Punishment (Samuel Roberts, ed., New York: New Press, 2016) 
(forthcoming).
RUSSELL G.  PEARCE
Edward & Marilyn Bellet Professor of Legal Ethics, Morality & Religion 
BA, Yale University, 1978; JD, Yale Law School, 1981
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Difference Blindness v. Bias Awareness: Why Well-Intentioned Law Firms Have 
Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships,” 83 Fordham Law Review 2407-2455 (2015) 
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[with Eli Wald & Swethaa S. Ballakrishnen].
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“What’s Love Got to Do with Lawyers? Thoughts on Relationality, Love, and 
Lawyer’s Work.” Review of Martin Luther King, Jr. & The Morality of Legal Practice: 
Lessons in Love and Justice by Robert Vischer. 17 Legal Ethics 334-52 (2014) [with 
Eli Wald].
JOSEPH M. PERILLO 
Distinguished Professor of Law, Emeritus  
AB, Cornell University, 1953; JD, Cornell University Law School, 1955
BOOKS:
Calamari and Perillo on Contracts, 7th ed. St. Paul, MN: West, 2014.
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Donee Beneficiaries and the Parol Evidence Rule,” 27 St. Thomas Law Review 496-
505 (2014).
JOHN PFAFF
Professor of Law 
BA, University of Chicago, 1997; JD, University of Chicago School of Law, 2003; 
PhD, University of Chicago, 2005
BOOKS:
Sentencing Law and Policy. New York: Foundation Press, 2015.
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“The War on Drugs and Prison Growth: Limited Importance, and Limited 
Legislative Options,” 52 Harvard Journal on Legislation 173-220 (2015).
“Federal Sentencing in the States: Some Thoughts on Federal Grants and State 
Imprisonment,” 66 Hastings Law Journal 101-34 (2015).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“For true penal reform, focus on the violent offenders,” Washington Post, July 26, 
2015, at A15.
“The Complicated Economics of Prison Reform” (Book review), 114 Michigan Law 
Review 951-981 (2016).
CATHERINE POWELL
Associate Professor of Law  
BA, Yale College; MPA, Princeton University (International Development 
Concentration) Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; JD, 
Yale Law School, Earl Warren Scholar
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JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Autonomy in the Shadow of Marriage Equality,” 84 Fordham Law Review 69-78 
(2015).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:      
“Gender Indicators as Global Governance: This Is Not Your Father’s World Bank” in 
Big Data, Big Challenges in Evidence-Based Policy Making (Kumar Jayasuriya, ed., St. 
Paul, MN: West Academic, 2015).
Women and Girls in the Afghanistan Transition. Working Paper for Council on  
Foreign Relations, 2014, available at: http://www.cfr.org/women/women-girls- 
afghanistan-transition/p33152.
PAUL RADVANY 
Clinical Associate Professor of Law  
BA, Columbia University, 1989; JD, Columbia Law School, 1993
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Preparing Law Students to Become Litigators in the New Legal Landscape,” 33 
Review of Litigation 881-903 (2014).
“Recent Trends in Discovery in Arbitration and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,” 34 Review of Litigation 705-50 (2015).
JOEL R.  REIDENBERG
Stanley D. and Nikki Waxberg Professor of Law and Director, Fordham Center on Law 
& Information Policy 
AB magna cum laude, Dartmouth College, 1983; JD, Columbia Law School, 
1986; DEA, Université de Paris I-Sorbonne, 1987; PhD (Law), Université de Paris 
I-Sorbonne, 2003
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Privacy in Public,” 69 University of Miami Law Review 141-159 (2014).
“Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches between Meaning and Users’ 
Understanding,” 30 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 39 (2015) [with T. Breaux, L. 
Cranor, et al.].
“Patents and Small Participants in the Smartphone Industry,” 18 Stanford Technology 
Law Review 375-429 (2015) [with N. Cameron Russell, Maxim Price & Anand 
Mohand].
“Privacy Harms and the Notice and Choice Framework,” 11 I/S: A Journal of Law 
and Policy for the Information Society 485-524 (2014) [with N. Cameron Russell, T. 
Norton, A. Callen & S. Qasir].
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BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Patents and Small Market Participants in the Smartphone Industry,” WIPO: 
Geneva, 2015, available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipcompetition/
en/studies/clip_smartphone_patent.pdf [with Maxim Price, N. Cameron Russell, & 
Anand Mohan].
N. CAMERON RUSSELL
Executive Director, Fordham Center on Law & Information Policy 
BSBA, UNC-Chapel Hill, 2002; JD, University of Denver Sturm College of Law, 
2006; LLM magna cum laude, Fordham Law School, 2013
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches between Meaning and Users’ Understanding,”  
30 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 39 (2015) [with Joel Reidenberg, et al.].
“Patents and Small Participants in the Smartphone Industry,” 18 Stanford Technology 
Law Review 375-429 (2015) [with Joel Reidenberg, Maxim Price & Anand Mohand].
“Privacy Harms and the Notice and Choice Framework,” 11 I/S: A Journal of Law 
and Policy for the Information Society 485-524 (2014) [with Joel Reidenberg, T. 
Norton, A. Callen & S. Qasir].
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Patents and Small Market Participants in the Smartphone Industry,” WIPO: 
Geneva, 2015, available at: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipcompetition/
en/studies/clip_smartphone_patent.pdf [with Joel Reidenberg, Maxim Price & 
Anand Mohan].
AARON SAIGER
Professor of Law 
AB, Harvard College, 1988; JD, Columbia Law School, 2000; PhD, Princeton 
University, 2004
BOOKS:
Schooling in the Cloud. Oxford: Oxford University Press  (forthcoming).
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Chevron and Deference in State Administrative Law,” 82 Fordham Law Review 555-
85 (2014).
“The Interaction of Local Government Law and State Administrative Law,” 77 Ohio 
State Law Journal 423-56 (2016).
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BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“‘Diversity’ drive for top NY high schools is anti-diversity,” New York Post,  
December 14, 2014, available at: http://nypost.com/2014/12/14/diversity-drive- 
for-top-ny-high-schools-is-really-anti-diversity/.
“Test Unrest,” 20 CityLaw 1, 16-19 (2015).
JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN
Associate Professor of Law 
BA, Yale University, 1996; JD, Yale Law School, 2002; PhD, Yale University, 2008
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce 
Commission, the Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance,” 
31 Journal of Law & Politics 139-186 (2015).
“Foreword: Gaps, Dams, and Damnation: Legality and Morality in Anti-
Corruption Law,” (Symposium Issue), 84 Fordham Law Review 407-21 (2015).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“The Legitimacy of Administrative Law.” Review of five books by Jerry Mashaw, 
Nicholas Parrillo, Daniel Ernst, Joanna Grisinger & Philip Hamburger. 50 Tulsa 
Law Review 301-316 (2015).
“The Golden or Bronze Age of Judicial Selection?” 100 Iowa Law Review Bulletin 
69-76 (2015).
RICHARD SQUIRE 
Professor of Law  
BA summa cum laude, Bowdoin College, 1993; MBA, Harvard University, 2001;  
JD magna cum laude, Harvard Law School, 2001 
BOOKS:
Getting Ready for the Next Bailouts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016) 
(forthcoming).
Corporate Reorganization in Bankruptcy (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & 
Business, 2016) (forthcoming). 
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Internal versus External Asset Partitioning” in Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Law and Governance ( Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, eds., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016) (forthcoming) [with Henry Hansmann].
“Incomplete Organizations: Legal Entities and Asset Partitioning in Roman 
Commerce” in Roman Law and Economics (Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016) (forthcoming) [with Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman].
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“The Artificial Collective-Action Problem in Lawsuits against Insured Defendants” 
in Research Handbook in the Law & Economics of Insurance (Peter Siegelman & 
Daniel Schwarcz, eds., Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2015). 
LINDA SUGIN
Professor of Law 
BA, Harvard University, 1984; JD, New York University School of Law, 1988
BOOKS: 
Cumulative Supplement to The Individual Tax Base: Cases, Problems and Policies in 
Federal Taxation, 2d ed. St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters/West, 2014 [with Laurie L. 
Malman].
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Strengthening Charity Law: Replacing Media Oversight with Advance Rulings for 
Nonprofit Fiduciaries,” 89 Tulane Law Review 869-908 (2015).
“Invisible Taxpayers,” 69 Tax Law Review (2016) (forthcoming).  
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Don’t Give Up on Taxes.” Review of We Are Better Than This by Edward D. 
Kleinbard. Tax Notes, December 22, 2014.
“Your Name on a Building and a Tax Break Too,” New York Times Op-Ed Section, 
March 11, 2015, available at http://nyti.ms/1D3SMkl.
OLIVIER SYLVAIN
Associate Professor of Law 
BA, Williams College, 1995; JD, Georgetown University Law Center, 1999; MPhil, 
Columbia University, 2005; PhD, Columbia University, 2010
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total 
Surveillance,” 49 Wake Forest Law Review 485-523 (2014).
“Legitimacy and Expertise in Global Internet Governance,” 13 Colorado Technology 
Law Journal 31-44 (2015).
“Disruption and Deference,” 74 Maryland Law Review 715-775 (2015).
“Network Equality,” 67 Hastings Law Journal 443-97 (2016).
“Network Equality [Igualidad de Internet],” Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
(2016) (forthcoming) [Spanish translation]. 
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“An Old Tobacco Town Battles Over Smokin’ Fast Broadband,” Wall Street Journal, 
September 6, 2014, at A13 [with Nestor M. Davidson]. 
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ZEPHYR TEACHOUT
Associate Professor of Law 
BA, Yale University, 1993; MA, Duke University, 1999; JD, Duke Law School, 1999
BOOKS:
Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuffbox to Citizens United. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014.
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“The Forgotten Law of Lobbying,” 13 Election Law Journal 4-26 (2014).
“Neoliberal Political Law,” 77 Law & Contemporary Problems 215-237 (2014).
STEVE THEL 
Wormser Professor of Law 
BA, North Texas State University, 1976; JD, Harvard Law School, 1979
BOOKS:
Investment Management Law & Regulation, 3d ed. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 
2015 [with Harvey Bines].
2015 Cumulative Supplement, Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and 
Injunctions. New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2015 [with Edward Yorio].
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Contra Proferentem and the Role of the Jury in Contract Interpretation,” 87 Temple 
Law Review 773-91 (2015) [with Ethan J. Leib].
IAN WEINSTEIN
Professor of Law 
BA, Reed College, 1981; JD cum laude, New York University School of Law,  
Order of the Coif, 1986; LLM, Georgetown University Law Center, 1990
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Learning and Lawyering Across Personality Types,” 21 Clinical Law Review 427-
453 (2015).
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Access to Civil Justice in America: What Do We Know” in Beyond Elite Law: Access 
To Civil Justice For Americans Of Average Means (Samuel Estreicher & Joy Radice, 
eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
104    |     FORDHAM LAW
ELISABETH WICKERI 
Executive Director, Leitner Center for International Law & Justice and Adjunct 
Associate Professor of Law  
BA, cum laude, Smith College, 2000; JD, New York University, 2004
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Urban Warfare” in Humanitarian Response 
in Urban Settings (Brendan Cahill, ed., New York: Fordham University Press, 2016 
(forthcoming) [with Florian Ratzesberger].
BENJAMIN ZIPURSKY
Professor of Law and James H. Quinn ’49 Chair in Legal Ethics 
BA, Swarthmore College, 1982; MA, University of Pittsburgh, 1985; PhD, 
University of Pittsburgh, 1987; JD magna cum laude, New York University School 
of Law, 1991
JOURNAL ARTICLES:
“Reasonableness in and out of Negligence Law” 163 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 2131-2170 (2015).
“The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the Common Law of Torts,” 65 DePaul 
Law Review  (2016) (forthcoming) [with John C.P. Goldberg].
BOOK CHAPTERS & OTHER WRITINGS:
“Torts and the Rule of Law” in Private Law and the Rule of Law (Lisa Austin & 
Dennis Klimchuk, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
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